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by Pierre H. BouLLE * 
111 its colonial aspects, the Seven Years ' War (1756-1763) looms as tht' 
nwst crucial moment in what some have called the Second Hundred 
Years' War, pitting against each other Great Britain and France since the 
lat e seventeenth century in a struggle for mastery of the Atlantic tradf'. 
The peace treaty of 1763 virtually eliminated France from North America 
and sharply reduced its position in Africa and India. Only in the West In-
dies did French possessions emerge relatively unscathed. The balance of 
power thus irreversibly shifted in Great Britain's favour and, despite later 
efforts to reverse the situation, the colonial settlement of 1763 rt>mained 
011 the whole unchanged until well into the nineteenth century. 
Given this outcome, some approximation of the relative importance 
of colonial trade to France's overall economy on the eve of the Seven 
Years' War ought to be attempted, if only to provide a more accurate 
gauge of the short-term impact of the war on this economy. It is also well 
worth identifying what sectors of colonial trade had grown most rapidly 
and what ports were associated with them. In this fashion, it should be 
possible to determine as well the long-range prospects for economic 
recovery offered to France in 1763; in short, to analyse th e kind of bargain 
the peace of Paris, in its colonial clauses, actually turned out to be. 
* 
* * 
From the outset, the study of eighteenth-century French colonial 
commerce is faced with an almost insurmountable difficulty, the lack of 
genuinely reliable commercial statistics, which dooms to failure any 
attempt at more than an approximation of the volume of French trade. No 
set of eighteenth-century statistics is entirely trustworthy. Those 
tabulated by the chambers of commerce are often doubtful, to say the 
leas t , for frequently they were drafted so as to lend support to the repeated 
appeals which local commercial interests made to the government. 1 The 
statis tics which began to be gathered by governmental agencies in the 
eighteenth century and especially those of the Bureau of Statistics are 
* Department of History , McGill University. 
1 See th e comments of Jean-Auguste BRUTAILS, ed., lnventaire sommaire des 
archives departementales anterieures d 1790: Gironde, III (Bordeaux, 1895) , vi-vii. 
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generally to be preferred, 2 yet they too cannot be wholly trusted, and this 
for two reasons. First of all, it must be recognized that the science of 
statistics was then in its infancy and that its fledgling practitioners were 
far too inexperienced, at least at first, to be critical of the figures they 
received and concerned over the extent of the ground they covered. As the 
century progressed, however, and as the official statisticians gained the 
necessary critical sense, their work became much more sophisticated. A 
far more serious source of inaccuracy lay in the origin of the figures 
tabulated by that bureau. Based on the declarations of the tax farmers con-
cerning the amount of trade on which they had levied duties in each 
generalite, these figures may have reflected certain willful inaccuracies in 
the farmers' declarations or in those of the merchants reporting to them. 
At least, they did not take into account what was smuggled into the realm, 
a sizeable amount at a time when duties were high and prohibitive 
regulations many. 3 Yet a picture emerges and, if its details are not ac-
curate, it is at least suggestive of the scope and patterns of colonial trade, 
and the latter's relationship to France's external commerce as a whole. 
It is unfortunately impossible to make a rigorous comparison 
between external and internal commerce, nor is it within our means to 
statistically analyse the links between the two. Partly because of mncan-
tilist preconceptions, comprehensive figures on French domestic trade do 
not seem to have been gathered and, indeed, such a programmf' was far 
beyond the meager facilities of the eighteenth-century statisticians. Exter-
nal commerce must therefore be looked at by itself. Certain indications 
concerning internal trade are nonetheless available. These suggest that the 
overwhelming volume of French commerce was domestic (one source 
places it between three-quarters and four-fifths of the total trade). 1 
Furthermore, even though the bulk of these exchanges remained local and 
regulated by traditional practices, a growing sector was becoming linked to 
2 Created in 1713 by an order in Council, the Bureau des statistiques was a 
government office whose purpose was to provide the crown with an exact picture of 
France' s balance of commodity trade through the gathering of import and export figures. 
At the time of the ,Revolution, Amboise Marie Arnould, the bureau's director, published a 
recapitulation of eighteenth century statistics from figures taken from his files and from 
other sources when the infol;Jllation of his office was incomplete. This work, De la balance 
du commerce et des relations commerciales exterieures de la France, dans toutes Les parties du 
globe, particulierement a la.fin du regne de Louis XIV et au moment de la Revolution (2nd ed.; 
3 vols.; Paris, Year Ill), first published in 1791, is regarded by most historians as the most 
reliable collection of general French commercial statistics for the period. 
3 For an evaluation of eighteenth century statistics and for the origins of the 
Bureau des statistiques and its work, see Emile LEVASSEUR, Histoire du commerce de la France 
avant 1789 (Paris, 1911 ), pp. 509-11; Henri SEE, L 'Evolution commerciale et industrielte de 
la France sous l'ancien regime (Paris, 1925), PP· 45-46; Pierre DARDEL, Navires et marchan-
dises dans Les ports de Rouen et du Havre au XVIII• siecle (Paris, 1963), pp. 7-8, 15-16 and 
19-21. See also the comments of Pierre LEON in Fernand BRAUDEL and Ernest LABROUSSE, 
eds. , Histoire economique et sociale de la France, II, Des derniers temps de l 'age seigneurial 
aux preludes de /'age industriel, 1660-1789 (Paris, 1970). pp. 499-.503. 
4 Pierre LF.oN and Charles CARRIERE, in ibid., p. 180. 
50 HISTOIRE SOCIALE - SOCIAL HISTORY 
external commerce. The negociants engaged in this sector carried to it the 
practices developed in international commerce. Though, therefore, a divi-
sion between internal and external trade is somewhat arbitrary, one can 
distinguish between a traditional sector and a more modern one. The 
latter, in which external trade played the key role, affected a considerable 
part of the French economic life. It reached all areas of France and in-
fluenced directly or indirectly all classes. 5 
The eighteenth century witnessed a tremendous growth of France's 
external commerce. Of course, the phenomenon was European-wide, but 
it was remarkable enough for France, whose commerce grew more rapidly 
than Britain's until the Seven Years' War. 6 The ~ures in Table I below 
indicate that French trade was unchecked by war until then, and that it 
continued to rise in subsequent periods, the peace years more than making 
up the deficits occasioned by wartime reverses. Total external trade reach-
ed five times its 1715 value at the outbreak of the French Revolution and 
colonial commerce, though it fluctuated more widely than other types of 
trade, made even better strides, growing nearly ten times in the same 












Table I: Average Yearly Value of the External Trade of France, 1715-1788 
(in millions of livres) 
AMER If.A f.OMPAGNIE DES TOTAL COLONIAL OTTOMAN EMPIRE: TOTAL FRENr.H 
& WEST AFRlf.A INDES TRAFFIC EUROPE LEVANT & N.AFR . EXTERNAL TRADE 
Imp. Exp. Total Imp. Exp. Total Imp. Exp. Total Imp. Exp. Total Imp. Exp. Total Imp. Exp. Total 
16.3 9.3 25.6 6.0 3.6 9.6 22.3 12.9 35.2 61.5 100.3 161.8 3.5 2.6 6.1 87.3 115.8 203.I 
17.1 15.I 32.2 12.2 8.7 20.9 29.3 23.8 53.1 75.7 110.2 185.9 4.4 6.1 I0.5 109.4 140.5 249.9 
20.6 15.0 35.6 18.9 9.5 28.4 39.5 24.5 64.0 72.3 11 7.6 189.9 4.7 13.4 18.1 116.5 155.5 272.0 
35.4 20.6 56.0 19.0 15.I 34. 1 54.4 35.7 90.I 96.4 135.5 231.9 7.5 12.9 20.4 158.3 184.1 342.4 
36.9 25.2 62.1 13.0 9.5 22.5 49.9 34.7 84.6 107.2 181.6 288.8 16.0 18.4 34.4 173.I 234.7 407.8 
65.2 35.2 100.4 20.2 17.3 37.5 85.4 52.5 137.9 146.9 242.9 389.8 27.9 26.9 54.8 260.2 322.3 582.5 
15.5 12.2 27.7 5.4 4.3 9.7 20.9 16.5 37.4 126.3 199.2 325.5 17.8 19.5 37_3 185.9 251.7 437.6 
110.I 37.0 147. 1 18.0 12.2 30.2 128.I 49.2 177.3 156.0 292.1 448.I 30.7 28.5 59.2 314.8 369.8 684.6 
102.7 47.8 150.5 .8 9.9 10.7 103.5 57.7 161.2 196.0 245.3 441.3 26.9 16.0 42.9 326.4 319.0 645.4 
182.5 87.9 270.4 31.9 25.3 57.2 214.4 113.2 327.6 285.0 334.7 619.7 36.8 18.5 55.3 536.2 466.4 1002.6 
Source: Figures taken from Arnould, Balance du commerce, III, tables 10-13. For the 
purpose of easy comparison, all figures have been reduced to the same 
ratio - 51 livres per silver mare, the value of the French currency between 1733 
and 1763. 
5 Ibid., pp. 162-65. See also the following works for examples of negociants who 
participated in both external and internal sectors of trade: Jean CAVIGNAC, Jean Pellet, 
commer~ant en gros, 1694-1772; contribution d l'etude du negoce bordelais au XVIII• siecle 
(Paris, 1967) , and Pierre LfoN, Marchands et speculateurs dauphinois dans le monde antillais 
du XV/11' siecle. Les Dolle et Les Raby (Paris, 1963). 
6 LtoN, in BRAUDEL and LABROUSSE, Histoire economique et sociale de la France, 
II , 503-05. 
7 Pierre Leon's figures (Figs. 52-54, in ibid., pp. 502, 504 and 506), based on a 
much more sophisticated computing of various eighteenth century sources than Ar-
nould's (ibid., p. 500n), vary somewhat from those given in Table I, taken from Arnould. 
In particular, Leon seems to have taken into accoun(more effectively than the Bureau of 
Statistic's director the price rise which affected France in the latter part of the century, so 
that his curve, while sharper than Arnould's in the first half of tbe century, flattens out in 
the second half in a manner not clearly identifiable in Table I (cf. ibid .. p. 500 and the 
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official outbreak of the Seven Years' War, between 1749 and 1755, that 
the rate of increase was most marked. The progress made during these 
seven years of unimpeded sea trade, if not of genuine peace, matched that 
of the previous thirty-two. 
Quite naturally, France's major ties were with the rest of Europe. 
During the period 17 49-1755, this trade counted for over two-thirds of her 
entire external commerce. The rest was shared unequally between three 
non-European areas. The most important was the area which included the 
colonies proper - the West Indies and North America - and their sup-
porting stations, the slave trading factories of West Africa. In the years 
preceding the Seven Years' War, this segment represented over half of the 
French trade outside Europe ( 17 .2% of the total external trade). Far below 
it stood the commerce with the Near East and North Africa, carried out 
principally by Marseilles (9.4% ), and that which the Compagnie des lndes 
practiced in the Far East (6.4%). 
Such figures, however, are somewhat misleading, for they tend to 
minimize the importance of the trade outside Europe. Although this com-
merce was always inferior in volume to European traffic, it was, 
nevertheless, responsible for much of the growth described above. A com-
parison of the two makes this fact evident. Whereas the non-European 
commerce had reached by the early l 750's four-and-a-half times its 1715 
value, its European counterpart increased in the same period by only two-
and-a-half times. These figures become even more significant when one 
notes that much of what France shipped to the rest of Europe consisted of 
colonial re-exports. 8 
Furthermore, it must be remembered that French commerce and in-
dustry had been oriented outward by Colbert and that colonial goods 
played an important role in the mercantilist design. Colonial foodstuffs 
(especially West Indian sugars), Indian textiles and French luxury items, 
the latter often manufactured from such colonial raw materials as cotton 
and beaver skins, kept the trade of Spain, her colonies, and the rest of the 
Mediterranean world in French hands, maintained open communications 
with Scandinavia and the Baltic area, and made heavy inroads into the 
areas of Germany normally dominated by the Dutch and the English. 
Small as it was in comparison to its European counterpart, the colonial 
percenta~s given on pp. 503-04). While Arnould ' s statistics are no doubi less accurate 
and while they have the secondary disadvantage of being averaged over a number of years, 
they have been preferred here, for several reasons: Neither provides more than an ap-
proximation of the actual traffic and the discrepancies are not sufficiently large to in-
validate the earlier work. Furthermore, unlike Arnould's figures , which are expressed in 
numbers, those of Leon have been published in graph form and are thus extremely 
difficult to use for statistical calculations. 
8 George HARDY, Histoire sociale de la colonisationfrant;aise (Paris, 1953), p. 83; 
LEON, in BRAUDEL and LABROUSSE, Histoire economique et sociale de la France, II ,. 507. 
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trade was therefore in the eighteenth century the cornerstone of France's 
commerce. Furthermore, not only sailors and colonial merchants but 
store-keepers, workers, artisans, farmers, bankers and even rentiers lived 
off that trade, either directly or indirectly. Indeed, few were those, 
however deep inland they lived, who could find no relationship between 
their Ii velihood and the welfare of the French colonies. This was true 
many times over for the coastal areas, whose wealth and whose towns had 
grown because of the boom in colonial commerce. 9 
It can be understood, then, that the economic crisis caused by the 
Seven Years' War was severe. For the first time in the reign of Louis XV, a 
war not only slowed down the rate of increase in commerce but actually 
reversed the pattern and caused commercial figures to drop, according to 
Arnould, by some 25 percent. Significantly, it was the colonial traflic which 
took the most dramatic tumble, a decline of over 70 percent. Indeed, it 
seems likely that the critical condition of French commerce during the 
Seven Years' War was caused by that sharp drop in colonial trade. All 
other types of commerce remained more stable, perhaps because so much 
of the non-colonial trade was habitually carried on foreign vessels which 
as neutrals were usually protected from capture in wartime. 10 The 
Mediterranean trade, a maritime trade as well, dropped by only 32 percent. 
More significant, whereas the French imports from the rest of Europe 
dropped by only 14 percent, the exports, directly related to the arrival of 
colonial goods, fell by almost one-third more. In fact, if the colonial goods 
which were re-exported - an amount conservatively estimated at one-half 
of the total colonial imports - are subtracted from France's exports to the 
rest of Europe, it emerges that the European market of that country may 
have been reduced by only 5.2 percent. 
None of this, however, can give an adequate idea of the risks involved 
in carrying out colonial commerce during the Seven Years' War and the 
consequent losses suffered by the merchants of the French seaports. Great 
Britain captured 300 French ships before the war even started. Two-thirds 
of these were taken while carrying on colonial trade and the tonnage 
relationship must have been even more unbalanced since the West Indian 
and African trades, accounting for 105 of the losses, employed some of the 
9 
. The fact was recognized by the Bordeaux chamber of commerce, which stated 
in 1777 : "C 'est au commerce -des colonies que nos quais- doivent leurs embellissements 
par Les edifices qui Les bordent." Quoted by Frarn:;ois CROUZET in Fran<;ois-George PARISET, 
ed., Bordeaux au XVIII• siecle [Charles H1GOUNET, gen. ed., Histoire de Bordeaux, VJ 
(Bordeaux, 1968), p. 198. Walter L. DORN, Competition-for Empire, 1740-63 (New York and 
London , 1940), pp. 252-53; Louis-Philippe MAY, "La France, puissance des Antilles," 
Revue d'histoire economique et sociale, XVIII (1930), 464; Pierre LAFUE, Histoire du peuple 
fram;ais; de la Regence aux trois revolutions, 1715-1848 (Paris, 1952), p. 112. 
10 CROUZET, in PARISET, Bordeaux au XVII/•, p. 288. 
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French merchant fleet's largest ships. 11 By July 1758, the French 
merchant marine was even more depleted. Excluding the New-
foundland Banks fishing vessels, none of which returned safely to port, 
and the small ships on which coastal trade was carried, Bordeaux had lost 
by then 200 ships and Nantes 90; Le Havre's prewar colonial fleet of 70 
vessels had dwindled to 14, and La Rochelle had seen only six ships return 
from the 70 it had sent across the ocean. 12 
Sailors became scarce. In a country where the supply of seamen was 
far f rorn unlimited, the tremendous losses in shipping meant less man-
power for the general need. 13 The merchant marine, the navy and the 
privateers competed for this limited supply. The navy could use the full 
force of the government to fill its rolls and the privateers had little 
difliculty, because they could offer a share of the prize money to their 
recruits; but the merchant marine was forced to increase the wages it 
offered. Even when thus cutting his margin of profit to attract reluctant 
sailors, a merchant had to consider himself lucky if he was able to muster 
a full crew; more often than not, the enterprise had to be abandoned 
altogether. 14 
Furthermore, the frequency of French losses caused the insurance 
rates to rise to an almost prohibitive level. In times of peace, maritime in-
surance for a transatlantic journey cost as little as three percent of the 
declared value. By 1756, the rates were at least ten times that, and they 
were to go as high as 60 percent and more before the war was over. It was 
not worth sending a ship to the colonies at such rates, and more and more 
merchants were obliged to insure their ships only partially, or only the 
ship and not the cargo, or even to forego insurance altogether and rely on 
speed and luck to protect their investment. 15 
11 Figures from Mouflle D'ANGERVILLE, Vie privee de Louis XV, ou Principaux 
evenemens, particularites et anecdotes de son regne (2nd ed.; 4 vols.; Paris, 1788), UL 252-
53. See the list of Nantes vessels captured by the British in Jean MEYER, L 'Armement nan-
tais clans la deuxieme moitie du XVIII• siecle (Paris, 1969), pp. 378-83, where the tonna~e 
differential is confirmed for Nantes. 
12 Emile GARNAULT, Le Commerce rochelais au XVIII• siecle d'apres Les documents 
composant Les anciennes archives de la Chambre de commerce de La Rochelle (5 vols.; Paris 
and La Rochelle, 1887-1900), IV, 262. 
13 Even before the war was declared, about 12,000 French seamen had been 
captured by the British. A.-E. BoRELY, Histoire de la ville du Havre et de son ancien 
gouvernement (5 vols.; Le Havre, 1880-1885), III, 341. 
14 Jean DE MAUPASSANT, " Les Armateurs bordelais au dix-huitieme siecle; 
Abraham Grad is et l'approvisionnement des colonies ( 1756-1763) ," Revue historique de 
Bordeaux, II (1909), 178-79; Jean DE MAUPASSANT, Un Grand armateur de Bordeaux, 
Abraham Cradis, 1699?-1780 (Bordeaux, 1917) , pp. 59-60; Theophile MALVEZIN, Histoire 
du commerce de Bordeaux, depuis Les origines jusqu 'd nos jours, III, XVII/• siecle (Bordeaux, 
1892), p. 198; Richard PARES, War and Trade in the West Indies, 1739-1763 (Oxford, 
1936), p. 327. 
15 On the whole matter of insurance, see Henri SE:E, "Notes sur Jes assurances 
maritimes en France et particulierement a Nantes au XVIII• siecle," Revue historique de 
droit franr;ais et etranger, 4th ser., VI (1927), 287-311. The rates before and during the 
Seven Years' War, and the effect of such increases, principally in Bordeaux, are discussed 
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The Seven Years' War was indeed a period of severe crisis for French 
commerce. The merchant who sent his vessels to the colonies during these 
years was risking bankruptcy at each crossing._ Even if his ships were 
not captured, costs were such that profits were by no means guaranteed. 
Under the circumstances, the few dramatic bankruptcies and, more 
generally, the retirement of many active armateurs from the rolls of a 
number of ports are less surprising than the number of houses which were 
able to survive the war. 16 Nor did the economic crisis stop with the ruin of 
seagoing commerce. As colonial raw materials stopped arriving, much of 
the French industry which the trade serviced eventually ceased operations 
for the duration of the war. 17 The effect was cumulative : more and 
more people were put out of work as the colonial trade, which acted as a 
catalyst for the whole French economic life, came to a halt. 
Thus, the trade which France carried on with its colonies and the 
products which were exchanged, particularly the colonial goods received 
by France, played a role of primary importance in the general welfare of 
the French economy. It remains to establish which sectors of the colonial 
trade were particularly crucial to that economy. 
* 
* * 
Statistics are difficult to collect for a comparison between the various 
sectors of the French colonial trade in the l 750's. In Arnould's work, the 
onl y tables which cover the period lump together all colonial sectors, so 
that the only comparison they permit is one between colonial trade in 
general and other types of commerce. Arnould goes into more details for 
1716 and 1787, but, even in the tables covering these years, the 
breakdown is made by continents, so that West Indian and North 
in Henri SEE, " Le Trafi c d 'un negociant-armateur de Bordeaux aux Antilles (1751 -1758)," 
in Julien HAYEM, ed., Memoires et documents pour servir a l 'histoire du commerce et de l 'in-
dustr~e en Fran_ce, XII (Paris;, 1929), 284 ;. ".'-lfred DONE.AUD DU PL~-' " Histoire de la Com-
pagme fran\;aise des ln~es , Revue maritime et coloniale, en (loo9) . 20-21: MALVEZIN, 
Histoire du commerce de Bordeaux, XVIII•, p. 47; CROUZET, in PARISET, Bordeaux au XVIII•, 
p. 296; and MAUPASSANT, Abraham Gradis, p. 76. The Nantes situation seems to have been 
different , owing to the ability of that port 's merchants to insure their vessels abroad and 
especiall y in London. MEYER, L 'Armement nantais, pp. 149-50. 
16 See the table of armateurs in ibid., pp. 265-67, according to which 25 f ercent of 
Nant es' slave traders dropped out of the traffic between 1755 and 1769, not al of them, 
however, for reasons indicated above. For an even more marked pattern in Marseilles, see 
Gaston RAMBERT, Histoire du commerce de Marseille, IV : 2 , La vie commerciale de 1660 a 
1789 (Pa ris, 1954), p. 211. For Bordeaux, where many colonial traders interrupted their 
traffic before losses could permanentl y affect them, see CROUZET, in PARISET, Bordeaux au 
xvm•, P· 300. 
17
· The cause and effect relationship is easily seen in the case of the numerous 
sugar refineries studied in Paul-M. BONDOIS, " Les Centres sucriers fran\;ais au XVIII• 
siecl e," Revue d'histoire economique et sociale, XIX (1931) , 27-77, especially p. 36. Other 
industries which were affected were the textile and fashion industries. 
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American trades are lumped together, and the slave trade, the commerce 
with Senegal and that with the Mascareignes are put together as African 
commerce. 18 Figures such as these are not particularly useful; yet they re-
main practically the only easily accessible general statistics on French 
colonial commerce. 
More to the point is another group of statistics, found scattered 
throughout various archives, particularly those of the ports, and often 
reproduced in the works of local historians. These figures are more limited 
in scope than those which were gathered by the Bureau of Statistics; they 
deal with specific goods, or with the trade of the local port, or with that of 
a given colony. A few cover extended periods of time; most deal only with 
a few years. More important, the commerce which they represent is 
expressed in all sorts of ways (various units of weight, volume or curren-
cy) which cannot always be reconciled. By their very nature such 
statistics offer only a series of fragmentary pictures of French colonial 
commerce. Consequently, the summaries which can be constructed from 
them are neither complete nor entirely reliable. Yet they cannot lw 
replaced. 
In the case of the French export statistics presented in Table II 
below, some confidence can be taken from the fact that they were com-
piled by a central agency, the Ministry of Marine. They may be inaccurate, 
but, unlike the figures compiled by different local agencies, they were 
probably tabulated everywhere according to the same method and with the 
same preconceptions. Consequently, they are likely to be equally inac-
curate for each of the ports covered. 19 Furthermore, they are almost com-
plete, since they include figures for the five major ports through which 
most colonial commerce passed. The only difficulty is that they are 
expressed in a unit of volume, the tonneau de mer. 20 Since the price of a 
commodity does not usually depend on its bulk, volume is without a doubt 
the least reliable method of estimating the worth of commerce. In the case 
of exports, it may nevertheless be possible to use these figures to make 
comparisons, since goods of a similar nature were generally exported by 
the French ports to the various colonies. 21 
18 Balance du commerce, III, tables 2 and 6-9. 
19 For an evaluation of different statistical sources, see Gaston RAMBERT, Histoire 
du commerce de Marseille, VI, De 1660 d 1789, Les colonies (Paris, 1959), pp. 304-05. 
20 The standard eighteenth-century French tonneau was equal to 42 cubic pieds; 
it is approximately equivalent to 50 cubi~ feet, or 1.2? English freight tons. W~en refer-
ring to the tonnage of a vessel and not to its cargo (as 1t does here), the tonneau 1s equal to 
1.43 tons. For a detailed study of eighteenth-century maritime measurements, see Paul 
GILLE, "Jauge et tonnage des navires," Le navire et l'economie maritime du xv· au XVII/• 
siecle, ed. Michel MOLLAT (Paris, 1957), pp. 85-100, and Michel MoRINEAU, Jauges et 
methodes de jauge anciennes et modernes (Paris, 1966), especially pp. 13-29. 
21 The major articles exported to the colonies by each of the maritime generalites 
in 1787 are listed in ARNOULD, Balance du commerce, III, table 6. 
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lmports, however, are a different matter altogethf'r. Eightf'enth 
century colonies tended to specialize in certain products, some bulky and 
some not, and each with a different value. Consequently, import figures 
would be of little use if they were expressed in tonneaux. In spite of the 
fragmentary nature of the material, the only significant measure possible 
is the measure of worth, expressing commerce in terms of its monetary 
value. Table Ill below attempts to do this. It is doomed to inaccuracy by 
the excessive number of interpolations with which it has to be constructed 
and is incomplete. It is thus offered here with some hesitations. But it 
should at least serve as a rough gauge for comparing the commerce of 
France with various colonial areas. 
Table II: Average Yearly Freight Exported to the Colonies 
from Various French Ports, 1750-55 (in thousands of tonneaux) 
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Bordea ux 14.52 13.16 .50 .14 .01 3.13 1.07 .23 28.33' 4.47 .75 33.55 
Nantes 14.11 3.19 .07 .04 .01 .03 .32 .02 17.42 .37 4.42 22.21 
Lt> Havrp 3.07 5.15 .13 - .01 .03 - - 8.36 .03 .61 9.00 
La Rocht>llf 3.02 .52 - .07 - 1.27 1.57 .78 3.61 3.62 1.17 8.40 
Marseilles 2.51· 5.62 .05 .10 - .03 - .03 8.28 .06 - 8.34 
BavonnP .32 .98 .04 .07 - .18 .65 .13 1.41 .96 - 2.37 
H~nfleur .22 .31 .12 - - .19 - - .65 .19 .04 .88 
TOTAL 137.77 28.93 .91 .42 .03 4.86 3.61 1.23 68.06 9.70 6.99 84.75 
So urce: Figures tabulated from th e " TABLEAU de depart des Navires marchands de 
di ve rs ports. Pour les Colonies de l'Amerique," AN, Co lonies, F2B2. 
In the period immediately preceding the Seven Years ' War. Francc 
was engaged in five types of colonial commerce, three of which- the 
West Indian trade, the slave trade and the commerce with North 
America - were connected with the American continent and governed by 
a single body of regulations, stemming from the lettres-patentes of April 
1717 and giving to certain ports the exclusive right to trade there. 22 The 
22 To improvt> the co ntrol of the trade with the American colonies, and especially 
to simplify the collection of duties, the lettres-patentes of April 1717 required ships to 
leave for the colonies from fourt een ports and to return directly to their point of depar-
ture. These ports were Dunkirk , Ca lais, Dieppe, Le Havre, Rouen, Honfleur , St. Malo, 
Morlaix. Brest . Na nt es, La Rochelle, Bordeaux , Bayonne and Cett e. Prior to the Seven 
Yea rs' War. Brest was removed from the list (1749) because commercial shipping was 
dermt•d to conflict with the status of the port as a naval base, and six more were added: 
Marseilles (1719). Vannes (1728), St. Valery-sur-Somme (1750) , and Cherbourg, 
Lihoum P and Caen (1756). Foll owing the war , the process of liberalization was speeded 
up. with Fecamp and Granville admitted in 1763, Les Sables d'Olonnes in 1764, 
Rochefort, despite its role as a military port, in 1775, and St. Brieuc, Binie and Pontrieux 
in 1776. In the mt•antime. th e slave trade. permitted in Rouen, St. Malo, Nantes, La 
Roclwlle and Bordeaux since 1716, was opened 25 years later to all ports permitted to 
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Newfoundlands Banks codfish industry was an American trade as well, but 
it was not regulated like the others. The fifth category consisted of the 
monopolies still retained by the Compagnie des Indes, mostly the trade with 
territories east of the Cape of Good Hope, but also the comme~ce of 
Senegal and the beaver trade of Canada. 
It was not only geography and the legal system under which they 
functioned which differentiated these five categories of trade. Each fur-
nished vastly different products to France and each presented to those 
concerned a different set of problems. In short, each category was a 
specialty all its own. 
French commercial patterns reflected this fact. Specialization in 
colonial commerce went beyond the basic legal splits existing between the 
Compagnie des lndes, concerned with Far Eastern trade, the ports enjoying 
the privilege of American trade, and the others which could concern 
fhemsefves with the-colonial world only indirectly or through fishing. Not 
only were the firms engaged in colonial trade generally found to specialize 
in one type of commerce, but the "privileged" ports themselves tended to 
emphasize one category among those in which they were permitted to par-
ticipate. Although these patterns were not rigorous, specialization was 
nevertheless more typical of the period than diversification, so that few 
Table III: Average Yearly Value of French Colonial Commerce, 1750-1755 
(in millions of livres) 
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FRANCE 12.2 (8.5) 65.2 20.2 94.0 17.3 52.5 146.5 
Bordeaux IA (0.6) (18.8) 19.0 (6.5) 0.2 7.7 26.7 
Nantes 6.5 (0.7) 16.5 (17.2) 5.5 2.4 7.9 (25.l) 
Marseille 3.1 9.2 (12.3) 5.2 (5.2) (17.5) 
Le Havre (2.0) 12.2 (14.2) & Rouen 
La Rochelle l.7 0.05 7.8 4.6 12.4 
Bayonne 0.3 1.2 1.5 0.3 0.3 l.8 
Complenie 
des In es 20.2 20.2 17.3 17.3 37.5 
Source: See Appendix. 
Parentheses indicate particularly unreliable approximations. 
engage in American commerce. Finally, by an arret of October 31, 1784, the entire trade 
was opened to all harbors able to accommodate colonial shipping and the prohibition from 
returning to another port lifted. A monopoly shared by some 14 to 26 participants is not 
much of a monopoly. Yet, it was a much envied privilege and one which the merchants of 
eac h port defended vehemently. 
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similarities can be found between the five above-mentioned categories of 
colonial trade beyond the fact that they were all connected with the 
French empire and seriously disrupte& by the Seven Years' War. 
Of course, it was the Far Eastern trade which was the most 
specialized. The Compagnie des lndes jealously guarded its monopoly, 
thereby earning many enemies in the eighteenth century, especially in the 
l 760's, when the advocates of free trade were spurred on by the 
arguments of the Physiocratic School. This propaganda, and the fact that 
the company's shares had yielded generally declining dividends since 
1745, 23 convinced contemporaries that the Far Eastern sector was an in-
significant part of the French colonial revenues; it led in 1769 to the aboli-
tion of the company, accused of hindering the growth of commerce with 
this valuable area. 
In fact, the company's commercial activities were far more important 
than its critics let on. During 1749-1755, Far Eastern trade amounted to 
37.5 million livres a year, or approximately 27 percent of the entire 
colonial commerce of France. Only the West Indies yielded more. It is 
true that its rate of increase had not matched that of other colonial sec-
tors, but the company was not entirely to blame for this. As an older com-
merce, the trade with the Far East was bound to grow less quickly than 
American trade. Furthermore, growth was hindered by the peculiar finan-
cial system under which the company operated, a system which required it 
to pay its shareholders dividends not always warranted by its revenues. 24 
Such an obligation placed it permanently in a weak financial situation and 
encouraged it to be cautious. Nonetheless, the volume of trade with the 
Far East was large enough. Furthermore, Arnould's figures indicate that, 
although the commerce of the company was drastically reduced in the 
Seven Years' War, the decline was not significantly larger than the one 
caused by the war in other colonial sectors, and this in spite of the 
significantly greater risks which Far Eastern trade always incurred. 25 
The Compagnie des lndes was a national company in which all 
Frenchmen could invest. Nevertheless, it was those whose business 
depended on Far Eastern imports who were most directly affected by the 
company's commerce. One such group was the textile manufacturers, par-
ticularly those of Lyons, for whom the company was at one and the same 
23 Henry WEBER, La Compagnie frani;aise des lndes, 1604.1875 (Paris, 1904), pp. 
562-65. 
24 As a result of the failure of John Law's schemes early in the century, the 
Compagnie des lndes had been saddled with a huge debt on which inordinate interests had 
to be paid. Part of these dividends had to be made up through the company's commercial 
profits. Consequently, the company, whose character was no longer exclusively commer-
cial, was more dependent for survival on a continued commercial success than the usual 
trading venture. On the details of the company's dividend payments, see ibid., pp. 330-31, 
549-52, 561 and 685-86. 
25 See Table I. 
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time a useful ally and a dangerous competitor. On the one hand, thesP. 
manufacturers welco)Iled raw material, such as silk, which the company 
provided for their looms. On the other hand, they fought the importation 
of cheap Indian cottons, a threat to their own markets. 26 The merchants of 
Nantes were even more closely connected with the company's business. It 
was in Nantes that, earlier in the century, the company had conducted its 
annual sales; a significant part of the port's wealth still came from these 
sales, conducted since 1733 in Lorient, the harbor of the company. Not 
only did Nantes merchants still work as the company's brokers, but two of 
the port's principal businesses depended in large part on goods purchased 
from the company. A sizeable amount of colonial goods, coffee in par-
ticular, which Nantes exported to the rest of Europe, came not from the 
West Indies but from Lorient. More importantly, Nantes owed its 
predominance in the slave trade in great part to its connection with the 
company, from which it had gained the necessary experience and a signifi-
cant amount of the Indian textiles which in the eighteenth century formed 
one of the main articles of any cargo to West Africa. No-one in fact knew 
better than the merchants of Nantes how lucrative the Far Eastern trade 
was. It is not surprising, therefore, that the eighteenth century campaign 
against the company was initiated by certain merchants of Nantes, who 
hoped to be the main beneficiairies of the abolition of its Far Eastern 
monopoly. 27 
There may have been some debate over the value of the Compagnie 
des lndes' commerce; there never was any over the worth of the West In-
dian trade. "[It] ... has become," a contemporary justly noted, "an in-
exhaustible source of wealth for this kingdom." 28 In the period im-
mediately preceding the Seven Years' War, it had outdistanced by far all 
other colonial trades and nearly every port licensed to trade with the 
American continent was participating in it. For certain of these ports, 
Caribbean commerce was practically the only colonial trade and even La 
Rochelle, best known as the major outlet for Canadian goods, had nearly 
half of its colonial fleet, carrying over 50 percent of its exports to the 
colonies, engaged in the West Indian sector. 29 
26 Ernest PARISET, La Chambre de commerce de Lyon, I, Dix-huitieme siecle, 1702-
1791 (Lyons, 1886), pp. 78-80. -
27 Pierre H. BouLLE, "Slave Trade, Commercial O~anization and Industrial 
Growth in Eighteenth-CenturI ~antes," Revue fran~aise d'histoire d'outre-mer, LIX (1972), 
78-79 and 103; Paul JEULIN, 'Evolution du port de Nantes; organisation et trajic depuis /es 
origines (Paris, 1929), pp. 157 and 270-71. 
211 (Augu~te CHAMBON], Le Commerce de l'Amerique par Marseille (2 vols.; 
Avignon, 1764). I, 1. 
lY The West Indies are here taken to include Louisiana and Guiana. La 
Rochelle 's exports to that area amount to 50.2 percent of its colonial tonnage carried on 
47.1 percent of its colonial vessels. "PABLEAU de depart des Navires marchands de divers 
ports, Pour Jes Colonies de J'Amerique," Archives Nationales, Fonds des Colonies 
[hereafter: AN, Colonies , F2B 2), summarized in Table II. 
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Although almost every " privileged" port participated in West Indian 
trade, they did not all do so equally. Not only did Bordeaux and Nantes 
own a much larger share of the traffic than any other port (Bordeaux in 
particular held the first rank in all three of the main West Indian islands), 
but there was also a significant division of labor among the ports. The 
main Atlantic ports - Bordeaux, Nantes and La Rochelle - had been in 
Caribbean commerce since early in the seventeenth century and had had 
ample time to consolidate their position there. Consequently, although 
this was much less marked for Bordeaux than for the other two, 30 all three 
of these ports tended to favor St. Domingue, the most developed of the 
islands, and to ignore the Lesser Antilles. Their combined shipments 
amounted to a staggering 83 percent of the tonnage to St. Domingue as 
compared to 48 percent of that to Martinique. The pattern was reversed 
for the ports which had entered the trade more recently. These new-
comers, the most important of which were Marseilles and Le Havre, made 
greater efforts toward Martinique, presumably because they found less 
competition there. The same thing occurred for Guadeloupe, the un-
developed and overlooked dependency of Martinique, and for Guiana, the 
stepchild of West Indian commerce. The first received more cargo from Le 
Havre and HonAeur than from any other port while the second had almost 
as frequent ties with Marseilles and Bayonne as with Bordeaux and 
Nantes. 31 
The differences which characterized the French ports in their 
relations with the West Indies did not extend to the kinds of goods they 
imported from the Caribbean islands, each of which yielded more or less 
the same products. Sugar, of course, was at the top of the list. Though in 
Bordeaux the ratio of that article to other colonial products steadily 
declined in the eighteenth century, in value though not in weight, it still 
represented in the early l 750's 61 percent of West Indian imports. 
Bordeaux was the most important client of the area, and the ratio was not 
much different for other ports. Below sugar stood coffee, indigo and cot-
ton, which varied in rank from port to port, and much below these, cocoa 
30 The sources used by Franc;ois Crouzet, reflecting shipping rather than tonnage, 
indicate that Bordeaux still exported in 1749-1755 slightly more to Martinique and to the 
other Lesser Antilles (51 % ) than to St. Domingue ( 49% ). The statistics of Table II above 
give the exact opposite percentages. The discrepancy is insignificant, and it is clear that in 
Bordeaux's case the balance was finally tipped only after 1763. On the other hand, return 
figures indicate that the shift had already begun in the previous period, when according to 
Crouzet St. Domingue accounted for 58 percent of West Indian shipping to Bordeaux. 
CROUZET, in PARISET, Bordeaux au XVIII", p. 222. 
31 All the comparisons presented above are taken from Table II and, to a lesser 
extent , from Table III. See also Paul MASSON, Marseille et la colonisation fran~aise; essai 
d'histoire coloniale (Marseilles, 1906), pp. 180-81; RAMBERT, Histoire du commerce de 
Marseille, les colonies, p. 306; and DARDEL, Navires et marchandises, p. 150. 
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and tobacco. 3• 1t is on these products, and particularly sugar, that the 
wealth of French ports rested. This commerce permitted French 
merchants to compete favourably with the British on many European 
markets and even to corner some, as Marseilles did in Italy and the 
Levant. 33 It also changed the physiognomy of these ports, whose proud 
citizens utilized a part of their newly acquired wealth to construct new 
streets, buildings and monuments - in short, to give their cities a new 
look worthy of their success, a look which some of them (Bordeaux and 
Nantes in particular) still retain today. 
It remains to mention one more aspect of West Indian commerce, 
evident when colonial exports and imports are compared. It was normal, 
of course, that vessels returned from the Caribbean with a more valuable 
cargo than the one they had brought to the area. Such a difference 
represented the profits of the merchants involved; without it, the trade 
would hardly have been worth entering. A more significant difference, 
however, emerged in the commerce of certain ports, the Atlantic ones es-
pecially. These ports imported proportionately more from the West Indies 
than they exported to the area. Bordeaux, for instance, received over 95 
percent of its colonial goods from the West Indies, while it exported to the 
area barely 80 percent of the articles it sent to the colonies. 34 This dis-
proportion was probably as marked, if not more, for other "privileged" 
ports which traded with more than one colonial area. 35 One might at first 
he led to assume that the difference was made by the value of West In-
dian products, generally higher than those of other regions. This may 
explain in part the large percentage of Caribbean imports; no doubt it 
explains also the preference shown by merchants for the sugar islands. 
However, the discrepancy between Caribbean exports and imports had 
other causes as well. One reason was that the merchants of certain ports 
carried gold and other specie to the West Indies in order to make up a 
32 For Bordeaux figures, see CROUZET, in PARISET, Bordeaux au XVIII•, p. 229n. 
See also MALVEZIN, Histoire du commerce de Bordeaux, XVJJJ<, pp. 302-07, tables I and II. 
Unfortunately, figures for other ports are expressed in weight. If, however, the value of 
each article is taken into consideration, the percentages seem to be roughly parallel to 
those of Bordeaux. For these statistics, see MASSON, Marseille et la colonisation fran<;aise, 
p. 163n: Gaston MARTIN, Nantes au XVIIJ•...siecle, II, L 'Ere des Negriers, 1714-1774 (Paris, 
1931), p. 264n; ]EULIN, L 'Evolution du port de Nantes, pp. 238-39, table III, and 272-73, 
table V; DARDEL, Navires et marchandises, pp. 222-23. 
jj Louis-Philippe MAY, Histoire economique de la Martinique, 1635-1763 (Paris, 
1930), p. 147; Hubert Jules DESCHAMPS, Les Methodes et Les doctrines coloniales de la France 
du x VJ• siecle a nos }ours (Paris, 1953), P· 66; MASSON, Marseille et la rnlo11isatio11 frw11;aise, 
pp. 162-63. 
34 MALVEZIN, Histoire du commerce de Bordeaux, XVIII', pp. 204 and 302-07. 
tables I and IL 
35 Nantes, for instance, seems to have taken from the West Indies some 90 
percent of its colonial imports whiJe sending there only 69 percent of the articles it 
exported to the colonies. ]EULIN, L 'Evolution du port de Nantes, pp. 224-27, tables I and I 
bis. 
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somewhat deficient balance of trade. 36 This specie was not included in the 
import-export statistics and, consequently, vitiated to a certain degree the 
balance established between the two. A more important reason was that 
the profits of certain other trades were sent back to France in the form of 
West Indian products. 
One of these was the slave trade, which existed solely to supply the 
plantation colonies with the necessary manpower. Vessels engaged in this 
commerce left France loaded with brandies and pacotilles (inexpensive 
textiles, baubles, beads and other petty manufactured articles) which they 
exchanged for slaves on the West African coast. 37 They then brought 
these slaves to the West Indies and returned to France loaded with sugar, 
coffee and other Caribbean products. Profits were accumulated at each 
step of what became known as the triangular trade, but it was only when 
the expedition was liquidated in France that they were paid. 
In the second quarter of the eighteenth century, the slave trade was, 
above all, the specialty of Nantes which developed quite early the most 
rational and economic means of exploiting it. We noted earlier the benefits 
which the proximity of the Compagnie des Indes' sales had provided the 
Atlantic port. What articles of trade the company could not supply were 
brought by the Dutch, with whom Nantes had especially close relations, 
thanks in part to the religious affinities which had developed between the 
two prior to the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. They also carried 
colonial goods, sugar especially, from Nantes to the important North 
European markets. Nantes had thus created for itself a handy organization 
for its commerce, based on the African-West Indian triangular trade. 
Furthermore, owing to the capital generated by the slave trade, a 
transformation industry directed at the needs of the slave trade had been 
started in Nantes. Imitation of Indian textiles, inferior manufactured 
goods and other essentials of African commerce were beginning to be 
produced in Nantes and its vicinity and provided the slave traders with 
needed products at a much lower cost than that required for the genuine 
articles. Nantes also supplied the Loire refining centers with large quan-
36 The case of Marseilles, whose merchants shipped to the West Indies 
practically all the currency they earned through their sizeable commerce with Spain, is 
particularly notable, for it explains in part Marseilles' success in breaking into the West 
Indian market, but even Bordeaux was in the habit of including gold in its cargoes to that 
area. Masson, Marseille et la colonisationfrant;aise, p. 164; Deliberations of the Chamber of 
Commerce [hereafter: CC] of Bordeaux, July 22, 1751 , Archives departementales 
[hereafter: AD] de la Gironde, C4255, fol. 152. 
37 For the types of goods brought by slave traders to West Africa, see Abbe Jean-
Joseph ExPI~LY, Dictionnaire geographi9,ue, hist~;ique et politique des Gau/es et de la France 
(6 vols.; ParJS, 1762-1770), V, 58 (art. Nantes ), and Jacques SAVARY DES BRUSLONS, Dic-
tionnaire universe/ de Commerce, d 'histoire naturelle et des arts et metiers, ed. Philemon-Louis 
SAVARY (rev. ed.; 5 vols.; Copenhagen, 1759-1762) , V, 1084-85 (art. "Commerce du 
Senegal"). 
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ti ties of raw sugar, thanks to which the latter were beginning to dominate 
the French market. In this fashion, the Loire region functioned as though 
it had its own mercantilist policy, purchasing raw material and selling 
finished products whenever possible. The focus of this vertical monopoly 
was Nantes and its control was in the hands ot the city 's merchants, the 
slave traders in particular. 38 
The profits Nantes received were in proportion to these efforts, 
th•mgh they never even remotely approximated the staggering 500 percent 
the1retically computed by some contemporaries. 39 For one thing, 
expe1itions to the African coast were fraught with dangers; for another, 
the tnde was subject to frequent fluctuations, the price of slaves in the 
sugar :slands depending less on the supply and demand than on the 
econom;c conditions the traders found upon their arrival, so that crop 
failures and wars always tended to lower sale prices. 40 Still, it was not un-
usual for investors in Nantes' slave trade to obtain 50 to 100 percent 
returns on their capital and profits, in extreme cases, could reach double 
that figure. 41 Such percentages, however, were whittled down by the 
length of the voyages and the even longer time it took for payments to 
reach Nantes from the West Indies, so that annual returns were not as dis-
proportionate as appears at first from other sea trades or indeed from land 
investments. 42 The principal advantage of the slave trade was in the 
marshalling of large amounts of capital which could be reinvested more 
rapidly than those placed in more traditional ventures. Such a pyramid 
effect, however, meant that each new venture placed in jeopardy the 
profits and even the capital of previous voyages. 43 
38 BouLLE, " Slave Trade," passim. 
39 MEYER, L 'Armement nantais , p. 226. 
40 BouLLE, " Slave Trade," pp. 83-84 ; Andre DUCASSE, Les Negriers ou le tra/ic des 
esc/ai:es (Paris, 1948), p. 137. In general , however, the price of slaves in the West Indies 
was rising. See some representative figures for the island of St. Domingue in Gabriel 
DEBIEN, Une plantation de Saint-Domingue; la sucrerie Galbaud du Fort, 1690-1802 (Cairo, 
1941), pp. 57 and 87. 
41 BouLLE, "Slave Trade," p. 82. 
42 Such is the conclusion of Jean Meyer in his chapter on maritime profits 
( L 'Armement nantais, pp. 205-48), the first serious attempt at more than an approximation 
of this crucial problem. See also Perry VILES, "The Slaving Interest in the Atlantic Ports, 
1763-1792," French Historical Studies, VII ( 1972), 533. Although Meyer's logic is 
applicable to the entire eighteenth century, his calculations and those of Viles refer to the 
post-Seven Years ' War period, when profits are thought to have dwindled, and Meyer ad-
mits that such low rates of interest do not adequately explain the fortunes made in Nantes 
prior to the war. L 'Armement nantais. pp. 248 and 250. The methods of certain recent 
works on the profitability of the English slave trade may well be worth applying to the 
French. See Stanley L. ENGERMAN , 'The Slave Trade and British Capital Formation in the 
Eighteenth Century: A Comment on the Williams Thesis," Business History Review, 
XLV l (1972), 430-43. 
43 BouLLE, " Slave Trade," pp.l82-83; MEYER, L 'Armement nantais, pp. 215-22 and 
244. r 
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Only the most solid merchant houses could afford to take such risks. 
Not even Nantes was immune from bankruptcies, despite the vast 
experience of its armateurs. The failure of the Company of Angola, a large 
cooperative effort of Nantes slaves, occurring in 1753 right in the middle 
of the best period of the century, demonstrates this. 44 It is little wonder , 
therefore , that other less experienced ports steered clear from the slave 
trade until the latter part of the eighteenth century. Even the great port of 
Bordeaux hesitated. Indeed, although allowed to trade with West Africa 
since 1716, Bordeaux was not of much importance in the slave trade until 
after the Seven Years ' War; it did not, in fact , really begin this commerce 
until the 1740's. 45 
What Bordeaux hesitated to undertake, others were even less eager to 
join. Bayonne made some attempts after the War of the Austrian 
Succession, but its first two expeditions resulted in such severt' losst's that. 
thereafter, its merchants declared themselves "degoutes" of the traflic. '" 
Ba yonne, of course, was not only a beginner in the slave trade; it was also 
a port in difficulty, a port on the decline which could not afford to take as 
man y ri sks as the leaders. This last factor may also explain the reduction 
of the slave trade in the port of La Rochelle, which dropped from second 
place and the sole genuine rival of Nantes in the first half of the century to 
seventh place immediately after the Seven Years ' War. 47 This same factor 
might also explain why St. Malo, another important early eighteenth-
century participant in the slave trade, though it still sent some expeditions 
to West Africa after 1750, was now obliged to rely heav ily on capital 
foreign to the city in order to continue its participation in this expensive 
commerce. 18 No port with such handicaps could hope to compete with 
Nantes. 
In short, th e ports which managed to become important slave trading 
centers after the Seven Yea rs ' War were those which offered a health y 
outlook for commerce in general, and they elbowed their way into this 
lucrative trade by imitating the methods of their chief rival. Bordeaux was 
11 DUCASSE, Li's Ni;wiers, p. 137. For a list of Nantes bankruptcies be tween 1729 
and 17'10, some of them in the slave trade, see AD Loire·Atl ., C645, no. 3. 
1
'' CROUZET, i11 PARISET, Bordeaux au XVII/•, pp. 237-39. One other reason given 
by this author for Hordeaux 's rductance was that the port, unlike Nantes, did no_t need 
the slave trade to support its direc t West Indian trafli<' . adl'q11all'I\' s11ppli1·tl I" 1·1 ... n·"ion's 
agricu It 11 ral products. Ibid .. p. 211. · · ,... 
46 !CC Bayone j, ' "Memoire sur la traite des negres, " August 9, 1762, Archives de, 
la Cham lire de comml'rce I hereafter: ACCj de Bayonn e, B40. See also CC Bayonne to 
l>ulivit ,r, March 29, 1749, ibid .. B24, p. 214. 
17 L1u:ien l'iem' PEYTRAUD, L 'E~davage aux Antilles fmn~aises avant 1789 (Paris, 
1897), p. 138; MALVEZIN, Histoire du co1111111•rn• d1• llordt'l111X. XVIII" . p. ~(II). 
18 llenri SEE, '' Le Commcrct• maritime de la Hretagrw au XVIII" sircle," in Julil'n 
llAYEM, ed., M1;moiw~ t'l dorn.11wnts pour servir Ii l 'histoirt• du co11unerce el de l 'industrie en 
Fm11n· , IX (Paris, 192S), 7B. 
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such a port. with extensive colonial ties and a well-developed refining in-
dustry. For this city, the slave trade was only a natural extension of its 
prt>vious activities, undertaken when its merchants felt themselves strong 
t>nough to t>xpand their commerce in this direction. 49 But the most spec-
tacular t>xamplt> was Le Havre, which had dabbled in the trade with little 
succt>ss sincP the l 730's. A new process by which Indian textiles could be 
imitated was developed in Rouen in 1756; Le Havre could now compete 
favourably with Nantes in West Africa. Starting immediately after the war, 
it did so. By tht> end of the decade, it was well established and it was to 
ht•conie tht> second most important French centrt> for tht> slave tradl' 
lwfore tht> outbreak of the French Revolution. 50 Tht> availability for 
suflicient capital and reliable sources of inexpensive pacotilles Wt'rt', in-
deed. the crucial requirements for success. 
The commerce of Canada was also connected with the Wt•st Indian 
tradt>, although only partially and in a less direct manner. For La Rochelle, 
through which most Canadian commerce passed, there was little connec-
tion bt>tween the two. Every year on the average this port sent to the 
banks of the St. Lawrence some 15 vessels, loaded with manufactured 
goods and other articles to be sold in the North American colony, from 
wht>re most of them returned directly to France, with a cargo of furs and 
other Canadian products. 51 At best, however, Canadian production was 
small, and the colony's agriculture in the last decades of the French 
regime was plagued by numerous crop failures, as military preparations 
cut into the manpower available for farming. 52 Not even the vessels of La 
Rochelle, therefore, despite the long-standing relations of the port with 
the St. Lawrence valley, could always obtain sufficient cargo for the return 
trip. 53 When this occurred, they made a detour to the sugar islands, where 
I hey collected the necessary freight. 
49 Robert BouTRUCHE, Bordeaux et le commerce des Antilles au XVIII• siecle. 
(Orleam•. [1935]). p. 20. 
50 DuCASSE, les Negriers, pp. 155-56; DARDEL, Navires et marchandises, p. 140. On 
the beginnings of the printed textile industry in Rouen, see Andre HEMOND , John Holker, 
manu{acturier et ~rand fonctionnaire en France au Xf/Jjj• siecle, chs. I and II, especiaiiy pp. 
26-33 and 53-63: Charles SCHMIDT, " Les Debuts de l'industrie cotonniere en France, 1760-
1806." Revue d'histoire economique et sociale, VI (1913) , 263. 
5 1 See the figures for this traffic in Emile GARNAULT, le Commerce rochelais; Les 
rochelais et le Canada (La Rochelle, 1893), p. 45. See also " TABLEAU de depart des 
Na,ires marchands de divers ports, Pour les Colonies de l'Amerique," AN, Colonies, 
F ~H.2. Despite its importance, La Rochelle' s Canadian traffic did not amount to much more 
than 15 percent of the port 's total navigation. Figures for the l_atter can be found in 
GARNAULT, le Commerce rochelais au XVII/•, II , 111 and 127. 
5~ Jean E. LUNN, "Agriculture and War in Canada (1740-1760)," Canadian 
Historical Rei•ie1c , XVI (1935) , 123-26. 
53 Leon VIGNOLS, " La Mise en valeur du Canada a l'epoque frani;aise ," Revue 
d "histoire economique et sociale , XVI ( 1928), 720-95. 
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There was, of course, even less cargo to be picked up on the shores of 
the St. Lawrence by the ships of other ports. Almost inevitably, these 
ships would have to seek a return cargo in the West Indies. The 
government, realizing that Canada needed to import more than its exports 
could ever be worth, made some efforts to encourage a one-way traffic, but 
with little success, as few merchants showed themselves willing to follow 
La Rochelle's example and import goods to Canada on their own account 
without the guarantee of a return cargo. 54 
It was another matter entirely when the cargo to be brought to 
Canada was freight carried for the crown, par economie as the system was 
called. In the years immediately preceding and even more so during the 
Seven Years' War, a great demand for such cargoes arose as a result of the 
military build-up in North America. 55 Such a traffic needed no 
encouragement, for the profits it offered more than made up for the slight 
detour which ships were required to make in order to collect a return 
cargo in the Caribbean. In exchange for buying the supplies needed by the 
crown, hopefully at a lesser price than would have been paid by official 
agents of the king, and for carrying them to America, the merchants thus . 
employed were given substantial advantages. In the first place, the articles 
bought in this manner were considered at all times to be the property of 
the king, who bore the risks of the voyage. The contractor's responsibility 
for the goods ended as soon as he loaded them on his own vessel, legally 
viewed as leased by the king for the duration of the voyage. Unlike his 
colleagues who sold their own merchandise in the colonies, the king's 
contractor was, therefore, saved the necessity of carrying insurance on his 
cargo, a substantial saving in wartime. If his ship was sunk, he would not 
be paid for carrying the king's freight across the Atlantic, but he would 
still be reimbursed for and receive his commission on the purchase of the 
goods his ship had carried. Since his ship was chartered by the king, the 
contractor could also draw at times on the royal stores to fit it out; more 
important, he was given first choice of sailors after the royal navy. Finally, 
since his role was essential for the well-being of the colonial troops, he 
could at least hope to be paid more promptly than the average creditor of 
the king. Naturally, these were important advantages at all times. In 
wartime, when the risks of an Atlantic crossing became almost prohibitive, 
when naval stores and sailors were scarce and when the crown was 
particularly slow in paying its debts, these factors became signal 
advantages, well worth seeking. 56 
54 Maurepas to Chavigny, January 10, 1748, AN, Colonies, B88, fol. 42v. 
55 LUNN, " Agriculture and War in Canada," p. 126. 
56 For information on this subject, see MAUPASSANT, Abraham Gradis, passim., an 
excellent biography of the man who was perhaps the most famous of the armateurs pour le 
roi. The system was adopted for other colonies also, but only in the Canadian trade did it 
comprise such an important segment of the traffi c. 
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This carrying trade was mostly in the hands of ports other than La 
Rochelle, Bordeaux was especially active, probably because large quan-
tities of food and spirits, particularly the flour and wines which formed the 
bulk of any shipment to the American colonies, were available in the sur-
rounding region. 57 In the interwar years (1749-1755), it sent each year to 
New France some 27 vessels, bearing some 4,200 tonneaux, as compared to 
La Rochelle's 15 vessels and 2,800 tonneaux. Through its chartered trade, 
Bordeaux thus managed to ship a significantly larger volume of goods to 
the valley of the St. Lawrence than the region's traditional supplier 
(49.7% of the total imports as compared to La Rochelle's 32.3%). 58 Other 
ports imitated Bordeaux. Bayonne, in particular, had rather active ties with 
Louisbourg, where it annually sent an average of five vessels, in addition Lo 
the one or two destined to Quebec (800 tonneaux a year, or 9.8% of the 
total imports of New France). 59 Almost all commerce with Canada, 
however, went through either La Rochelle or Bordeaux. There is no better 
demonstration of their preponderance than the fact that the manufac-
turers of French cities, even when they had easier communications with 
other ports, preferred to use these two as their middlemen for Canada. 
Thus, for instance, the textiles manufactured in Rouen, which were in 
good demand at Quebec, were sent through Bordeaux and not Le Havre. 60 
Still more significant, Canadian furs for the Basque tanneries came 
through La Rochelle, even though the nearby port of Bayonne maintained 
regular ties with the colony. 61 
One more type of commerce can be directly associated with the 
colonies, the fishing for cod done by French vessels in the St. Lawrence es-
tuary, around Newfoundland and on the banks immediately east of this 
island. It would -be illfficult to overestimate the importance of this industry 
m the eighteenth century, when fish was the most important source of 
57 CANIELLE JuLLIAN, Histoire de Bordeaux dep_uis Les ori~ines iusqu, 'en 1895 
(Bordeaux, 1895), p. 529; BouTRUCHE, Bordeaux et le commerce des Antilles, pp. 18-20; 
Richard PARES, Yankees and Creoles; The Trade between North America and the West Indies 
before the American Revolution (London, New York and Toronto, 1956), p. 86. 
58 
"TABLEAU de depart des Navires marchands de divers ports, Pour !es 
Colonies de l'Amerique," AN, Colonies, F2B2. See Table II. Figures in Crouzet vary 
somewhat , but his percentages coincide with the ones given here. CROUZET, in PARISET, 
Bordeaux au XVIII• , pp. 236-37. 
59 
"TABLEAU de depart des Navires marchands de divers ports, Pour !es 
Colonies de I' Amerique, " AN, Colonies, F2B2. The other ports which had some trade with 
Canada were Nantes (2 ships a year), Honfleur, Le Havre, Marseilles and perhaps also 
Dunkirk, each of them averaging less than one vessel a year. Ibid.: . Raymond de 
BERTR.UW, "Le Port et le commerce maritime de Dunkerque au XVIII· siecle,' ' Memoires 
de la societe dunkerquoise, IX (1863-1864), 282. 
60 DARDEL, Navires et marchandises, pp. 152 and 154. 
61 
" Convention faite entre Mess I ieu lrs du Corps de ville et chambre de 
commerce de Bayonne et !es Fermiers generaux touchant le commerce et fabrique des 
peaux du canada," April 14, 1731, ACC Bayonne, H36, No. 9; CC Bayonne to Merchants 
of St. Jean-de-Luz, July 21 , 1751, ibid., B24, p. 357. 
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protein for Europe. At the beginning of the century, the French fishing in-
dustry owed less than a quarter of its revenues to Newfoundland cod; by 
1787, while the industry as a whole had grown sixfold, Newfoundland ac-
counted for 52.4 percent of the total, thus replacing the very coast of 
Europe as the main source of fish for France. Newfoundland cod was the 
fastest-growing type of fishing in which the French were engaged in the 
eighteenth century. During that period, it grew to 15 times its original 
value, or at almost four times the rate of its nearest rival. 62 
The most important fishing harbours were the ports of Granvillt>, in 
Normandy, and St. Malo, its Breton neighbor. In the period immediately 
preceding the Seven Years ' War, some 90 Newfoundlanders were armed 
each year by the first, while the second maintained a fleet of some 80. 63 It 
was these two cities, and particularly Granville, which served as semi-
official spokesmen for the whole industry, and they were consulted 
whenever important questions concerning the fishing trade arose. 64 
Immediately below stood Honfleur, the sister port of Le Havre, which sent 
61 vessels to the Great Banks in 1751. 65 Significantly inferior to these but 
nevertheless important were the harbours of St. Brieuc and Nantes in Brit-
tany; Les Sables d'Olonnes in Vendee, St. Martin-de-Re and Marennes in 
Poitou, and the Basque ports of Bayonne and St. Jean-de-Luz. 66 Below 
these was a whole series of minor ports found most particularly on the 
English Channel coast and in Brittany, where almost all fishing villages 
sent a number of vessels to fish in American waters. 67 
It is worth noting that, save for Nantes, whose fishing fleet was in 
sharp decline, 68 the major ports engaged in colonial commerce did not 
figure among those participating actively in Newfoundland codfishing. 
Marseilles did not at all and Bordeaux only slightly. 69 La Rochelle had 
62 Figures taken from ARNOULD, Balance du commerce, III, table 2E. 
63 Charles DE LA MoRANDIERE, Histoire de la {eche fran<;aise de la morue dans 
l 'Amerique septentrionale (3 vols.; Paris, 1962-1966), I , 551 and 567. 
64 See "Precis des negociations de M. le Comte de Guerchy Ambassadeur du Roy 
a Londres aupres de qui les sieurs Magon et Bretel furent deputes pour le commerce au 
mo is de decembre 1763. par permission de M. le Due de Choiseul a I' occasion des affaires 
de L'isle de Terre neuve,' AN , Colonies, CJ!Fl, fol. 96. Bretel was from Granville; Magon 
(or Mngnon?) may have been a member of the nnportant Delalande-Mag11on family, which 
dominated St. Malo trade at the time. The registers CllFl, 3 and 5 contain mem01rs .con-
cerning Newfoundland. Most of them are from Granville. 
65 LA MORANDIERE, Histoire de la peche fran<;aise, II, 538. 
66 Ibid. , pp. 572, 580, 589, 592 and 603. 
07 Ibid., pp. 525-42 and 574-76. See also DARDEL, Navires et marchandises, p. 427 , 
where a list is given of the French harbours which brought cod to Le Havre. See also 
ibid., p. 304. 
68 LA MoRANDIERE, Histoire de la peche fran<;aise, II, 580-81; }EULIN, L 'F:volution 
du port de Nantes, p. 174. 
69 MASSON, Marseille et la colonisation fran<;aise, p. 187; CC Bordeaux to CC 
Dunkirk, April 15, 1758, AD Gironde, C4264, (ol. 9. 
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barely begun to send vessels to the Great Banks when the Seven Years' 
War interrupted its armaments. 70 As for Le Havre, which had been one of 
the major participants in the seventeenth century and would become one 
again toward the end of the eighteenth, it had for the moment abandoned 
this industry almost entirely and busied itself with other activities, in-
cluding the colonial carrying trade. 71 It is true that St. Malo and Bayonne 
were active in both West Indian commerce and codfishing, but neither of 
them was any longer a great colonial harbor in the l 750's. In fact, a rule 
emerges which, although invalid for the seventeenth century, applies in 
almost all cases in the middle of the eighteenth: the more activity a port 
showed in colonial commerce, the more it neglected the fishing trade. 72 
The fact that the great ports engaged in colonial trade generally dis-
dained during the middle of the eighteenth century to maintain their own 
fishing Heets did not intimate a lack of interest in cod. Un the contrary , 
codfish was one of the important colonial commodities which they re-
exported to the rest of Europe i:nd even to the West Indies. "1 The fact of 
the matter was that the fishing trade was not regulated as strictl y as the 
colonial one. Unlike the ships engaged in the latter, fishing vessels were 
encouraged by the government to unload their cargo in ports other than 
their own. 74 Therefore, the great colonial ports were supplied with fish by 
the vessels of smaller harbours, unloading there without first returning lo 
their home ports. Thus, Marseilles, without a fleet of its own, received 40 
shiploads of cod a year, mostly from St. Malo; and the merchants of Le 
Havre, who sent a maximum of 12 vessels to Newfoundland on their own 
account, received up to three times this number in return. 7'' Nantes and 
Bordeaux also did a brisk trade in fish, most of which came from other 
70 GARNAULT, Le Commerce rochelais au XVJJJ•, IV, 332. 
71 DARDEL, Navires et marchandises, pp. 156, 426, 431-32. 
72 LA MoRANDIERE, Histoire de la peche franraise, II, 595. CROUZET, in PARISET, 
Bordeaux au XVJJJ•. 234-35, gives as a reason the higher salaries prevalent in colonial 
ports. 
73 In the middle of the eighteenth century, Marseilles was the major supplier of 
fi sh to the Mediterranean world - Spain, Italy and particularly the Levant. MASSON, 
Marseille et la colonisation fran(:aise, p. 187; RAMBERT, Histoire du commerce de Marseille, Les 
colonies , p. 491; LA MoRANDIERE, Histoire de la peche franraise , II, 609. Soon after the 
Seven Years' War, the Mediterranean market would drop significantly, but it would be 
replaced and even surpassed by that of nearby provinces. Ibid. For the fish re-exported to 
the W est Indies, see RAMBERT, Histoire du commerce de Marseille, Les colonies, p. 507 , and 
CLEMENT, " Memoire des Cotes de I'isle de Terre-neuve oti le fran<;ois fait la peche d 'Ete de 
moliie [sic] seche, de la Grande Bay_e nommee la Brador tenant au Continent appartenant 
aulran<;ois seul, de la Cote de t;aspee, de !'isle Hoyale et de leur produit," October 7 , 
1761, AN, Colonies, (11F5, fol. 16v. 
74 See, for instance, Rouille to CC Marseilles, November 14, 1751, ACC 
Marseille , Hl 15. 
75 RAMBERT, Histoire du commerce de Marseille, Les colonies, p. 502: DARDEL,. 
Navires et marchandises, pp. 426 and 431. LA MoRANDIERE, Histoire de la pechefranraise, II, 
535, gives figures for Le Havre which are significantly smaller than those found in Dardel. 
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French ports. 76 In this manner, although the great ports of colonial com-
merce did not participate directly in the trade, Newfoundland cod (con-




The impact of the colonies on France went beyond the trade patterns 
which the empire generated. More or less directly, a large segment of 
French industry was affected as well. The links were most direct, of 
course, with those industries which had been specifically created to 
transform colonial products. The most important of these was sugar 
refining, located in or near certain "privileged" ports. 77 By the middle of 
the eighteenth century, this industry had assumed large proportions and, 
thanks to a sizeable labour force, had overtaken its English and Dutch rivals 
to become the major supplier of sugar to the Europeans. 78 The largest 
centres of sugar refining were also the largest colonial ports. Bordeaux led 
the industry with twenty refineries in 1750, and La Rochelle and 
Marseilles were not far behind. Even though, after the War of the 
Austrian Succession, Nantes no longer refined its own sugar, it remained 
an important supply centre for the refineries established along the Loire 
valley, especially in Angers and Orleans. Finally, lesser centres existed in 
Rouen, Dieppe and Dunkirk, and at Lille, in back of Dunkirk. 79 
Other colonial goods were processed in France. The tanneries of St. 
Jean-de-Luz, which processed Canadian furs, and the silk manufactories of 
Lyons have already been mentioned. Others were the hat manufactures of 
Le Havre and Rouen. They too used Canadian furs, and also arabic gum, 
imported from Senegal as well as the Levant. 80 Tobacco, some of which 
came from the West Indies and Louisiana, was processed in Dieppe, 
Morlaix and Bayonne. 81 Worth a special mention are the textile mills of 
76 ]EULIN, L 'Evolution du port de Nantes, p. 251, table IV; CROUZET, in PARISET, 
Bordeaux au XVIII', p. 235; LA MORANDIERE, Histoire de la peche franfaise , II, 580-81 and 
597-600. 
77 Pere Dieudonne RINCHON, Les Armements negriers au XVIII· siecle d'apres la 
correspondance et la comptabilite des armateurs et des capitaines negriers (Brussels, 1956) , 
p. 12. 
78 Ibid.; MAY, " La France, puissance des Antilles," pp. 459-60. 
79 A description of all these centers can be found_ in BoNDOIS, "Les Centres 
sucriers franc;ais au XVIII• ," pp. 28-68. See also MAY, "La France, puissance des An-
tilles," p. 459. 
80 DARDEL, Navires et marchandises, p. 184; BoRELY, Histoire de la ville du Havre, 
III, 357. 
8I On Dieppe, see Abbe Michel Claude GUILBERT, Memoires pour servir a l'histoire 
de la ville de Dieppe, ed. Michel HARDY (2 vols.: Paris and Rouen, 1878) , I, 224-25. On 
Morlaix, see Joseph DAUMESNIL and Adolphe ALLER, Histoire de Morlaix. (Morlaix, 1879), 
P. 484, and Rouille to La Borde, December 9, 1752, AN, Colonies, B96, fol. 22lv. On 
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Nantes, Rennes and especially Rouen, which significantly increased their 
production in the l 750's because of the demands of the slave trade and the 
introduction of new processes for the cheap imitation of Indian textiles. 82 
The increased amount of cotton required came mostly from America. 83 
Similarly, as the century advanced and production increased, Lyons came 
to rely more heavily on Far Eastern and West Indian raw materials, par-
ticularly for its dyes. 84 However, not one of these industries, at least in its 
colonial sector, had the importance of sugar refining. 
Along with the industries which depended on the colonies for at least 
some of their raw materials, there existed some which relied in part on the 
empire for a market. This was the case for the home products of the 
provinces immediately surrounding major "privileged" ports; these 
products found their way to the colonies as well as to other markets. Thus, 
the colonies served the Bordeaux region as an outlet for its inferior 
wines, not disposed of on the European market as easily as the good 
clarets. 85 As for industry proper, as distinguished from agriculture, it too 
was in part dependent on the colonies for outlets. The industry which im-
mediately comes to mind is the manufacture of pacotilles in Nantes. 
Others, however, were connected to imperial markets, though perhaps less 
directly. The textile industry was one of these. 
Lyons, the greatest textile center of France during the ancien regime, 
worked mostly for exportation. Some two-thirds of the silks, gold brocades 
and other luxury textiles which it manufactured were sold abroad. 86 Its 
colonial exports were almost insignificant in comparison to the European 
ones, for they never reached more than four million livres a year, or one-
tenth of what the city's production of silk alone was worth. Nevertheless, 
the West Indies, the only colonies which could afford to buy luxury 
textiles in sufficient quantity, seem to have functioned as a safety valve for 
Lyons' production, especially plagued in the eighteenth century by the 
Bayonne, see same to CC Bayonne, April 14, 1751, ibid., fol. 81 v; Deliberations of CC 
Bayonne, April 15, 1750, and December 1, 1751, ACC Bayonne, B6, pp. 152.53 and 233. 
The establishment of tobacco manufactures in declining ports might have had something 
to do with the low wages paid there. 
8~ On these textile centers and Indian imitations, see BouLLE, "Slave Trade," 
pp. 93·102, and the works cited therein. 
83 A. LE CoRBEILLER, Histoire du port de Rauen et de son commerce depuis Les temps 
Les plus recules jusqu 'a nos jours (Rouen, 1902), p. 115; DARDEL, Navires et marchandises, 
p. 212. 
84 PARISET, La Chambre de commerce de Lyon, XVII/•, pp. 78-80. 
85 BouTRUCHE, Bordeaux et le commerce des Antilles, p. 20; CROUZET, in PARISET, 
Bordeaux au XVIII•, p. 253. The same held true of the wines of Provence, exported 
through Marseilles and preferred in the West Indies to those of Bordeaux because 
cheaper. MASSON, Marseille et la colonisation franr;aise, p. 162. 
86 Ernest PARISET, Histoire de la fabrique lyonnaise. Etude sur le regime social et 
l 'industrie de la soie d Lyon, depuis le X11• siecle (Lyon, 1901 ), p. 209. 
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serious market fluctuations generally associated with the luxury trade. 87 
Thanks to this secondary outlet, the more than 60,000 workers of Lyons 
found some work in times of crisis. 88 
But luxury textiles could find only a limited market in the colonies. 
Just as for the wines of the Bordeaux region, it was the inexpensive brands 
which were in greatest demand. In fact, a significant portion of the 
cheapest textiles produced in France was sold to the colonies, where they 
served among other things to clothe the West Indian slaves. 89 This was 
the function which was assigned, for instance, to the declining woollPn in-
dustry around Agen and Montauban, on the upper Garonne, shipped 
through Bordeaux. 90 Indeed, Bordeaux seems to have monopolized this 
trade. From St. Malo for re-export to the West Indies it received the bulk 
of the products of Brittany's cottage industry and from Rouen for Canada 
some of the coarser articles made by Normandy's rural weavers. 91 
Shipbuilding may also be considered to have been directly affected by 
the colonial empire. Shipyards did not exist only in the military ports 
(Toulon, Rochefort, Brest) but also in the "privileged" ones, most of 
which supplied their own demands and more. The most important private 
yards seem to have been in Bordeaux which built 15 vessels, or 3700 
tonneaux (5300 tons) of shipping, a year during the interwar period and 
would double that tonnage figure following the Seven Years' War. 92 
Almost as important and perhaps even .more interesting were the 
shipyards of St. Malo. In the twenty years preceding the Seven Years' 
War, this port lost a great deal of its trade to Nantes and to other rivals. 
St. Malo's relative inactivity was reflected in employment figures and in 
labor prices. In the long run, the problem was solved by a gradual emigra-
tion of workers to more fortunate regions. In the short run, however, the 
deflated wages paid labour encouraged the activity of the shipyards. 91 
87 For the fluctuation in textile manufacturing in Lyons and for its causes, see 
PARISET, La Chambre de commerce de Lyon, XVJJI", pp. 26 and 68-71; for their effects on 
the silk workers, see Maurice GARDEN, -Lyon ei Les lyonnais au XVJJJ• siecle (Paris, 1970), 
pp. 298-309, especially pp. 302-03. For the efforts to open new markets , including the 
West Indies, see also ibid., pp. 377-79. 
88 GARNAULT, Le Commerce rochelais au XVJJJ•, IV, 80; MAY, "La France, 
puissance des Antilles, " p. 475. Figures for the silk production of Lyons are available in 
PARISET, Histoire de la fabrique -lyonnaise, p. 209. 
89 PARISET, La Chambre de commerce de Lyon, XVJir, p. 105. 
9° CROUZET, in PARISET, Bordeaux au XVJJJ•, p. 274. 
91 SEE, "Le Commerce maritime de la Bretagne," p. 77; DARDEL, Navires et 
marchandises, pp. 152 and 154. 
n · CROUZET, in PARISET, Bordeaux au XV/Ir, pp. 278-80. On a typical 
shipbuilding complex near Nantes, see R. 0RCEAU, "Les Chantiers de constructions 
navales de Chezine et l'ile Mabou," Bulletin de la Societe archeologique et historique de 
Nantes et de la loire-lnferieure, LXXXVI (1947), 57-67. 
93 SEE, "Le Commerce maritime de la Bretagne," pp. 85-86. 
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Finally, one should mention privateering, in which most French 
ports traditionally participated in wartime. It is not essentially because 
privateers were particularly active in colonial waters, though they were, 
that they need be mentioned in a discussion of the colonial commerce or 
France. More important, the ports which had the privilege of trade with 
the colonies were among the most active in preparing "the little war," as 
privateering was sometimes called. The reasons for this relationship 
between colonial privilege and privateering are clear. The Atlantic sea 
lanes were familiar to the captains engaged in colonial commerce. Further-
more, among the ships engaged in the cross-Atlantic trade were armed 
merchantmen, solid wooden hulls capable of speed and thus ideally suited 
for privateering. 
It would be useless to list the ports which fitted out privateers during 
the Seven Years' War; practically all of them did. 94 Not all of them, 
however, took part in this activity with equal enthusiasm. The most eager 
were the traditional leaders - St. Malo, which abandoned all other traffic 
for the duration of the war, and Dunkirk, the city of the famous 
seventeenth-century corsair, Jean Bart, which demonstrated its continued 
ability by capturing at least 600 vessels worth around fifteen million 
livres. 95 
The most revealing activities, however, were those of other ports. 
One of these was Rouen, whose chamber of commerce, after the govern-
ment announced its decision not to renew the convoy system, proposed 
that all the French privateers be organized into large armadas, mean l lo 
supplement the deficient French navy in its struggle against the British 
and, more specifically, to protect the merchant marine in its colonial ac-
tivities. 96 Rouen's privateers were not very active during the Seven Years' 
War, 97 but the proposal of the chamber indicated more desire and energy 
for this type of navigation than the port had demonstrated for other 
maritime activities in the preceding years. 
A similar attitude could be found in Bayonne, which after years of 
claiming itself disinterested in maritime operations, appeared almost 
bloodthirsty in its eagerness for the outbreak of war and the consequent 
94 See E. DuCERE, Histoire maritime de Bayonne; Les corsaires sous l 'ancien regime 
(Bayonne , 1895), pp. 254-55, for a list (maybe partial) of the ports which participated in 
this activity . 
95 Si:E, "Le Commerce maritime de la Bretagne," p. 90; Henri MALO, Les Derniers 
corsaires. Dunkerque, 1715-1815 (Paris, 1925), pp. 103-04, who speaks of these figures as a 
" premier bilan." 
96 CC Bayonne to CC Rouen, July 24, 1756, ACC Bayonne, B25, pp. 487-88. 
97 Some of the activities catalogued under Le Havre may have been owed to 
Ro~en capital. Rouen privateers would not have bothered going upstream and would re-
main attached at Le Havre. On the activities of Le Havre, see BoRELY, Histoire de la ville du 
Havre, III, 343. 
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opening of the seas to privateers. From the very first inqumes of the 
Minister of Marine, Jean-Baptiste de Machault, regarding possiblP 
preparations for the arming of privateers, in the fall of 1755, Bayonne 
prided itself with being one of the few harbours genuinely responsiv e to 
the minister's suggestions. 98 Bayonne, along with its neighbour, St. Jean-
de-Luz, was among the first French harbours to let its privateers loose. 99 
Encouraged by some early successes, the two ports abandoned all other ac-
tivities to devote themselves to the little war. 100 
Bayonne's eager anticipation and warlike activities were not really 
sU£prising. The port was a traditional center of privateering and it had pa:-
ticipated in this type of navigation with marked success during the War of 
the Austrian Succession. 101 After the wartime hustle, the peaceful years 
which followed were disappointingly unfruitful. Many of the port's ships 
stood idle on the banks of the Adour and a number of them were sold. 102 A 
new war might finish the ruin of Bayonne's normal commerce; in the 
short run , however, war would give Bayonne the opportunity of recover-
ing some of its peacetime losses through a series of vigorous privateering 
campaigns. 103 
The interest of Bayonne's story is that it suggests a relationship 
between the decline of a port 's commerce (its colonial trade in particular) 
and its eager participation in the war of privateering. Not only Bayonne 
but St. Malo and Dunkirk were older ports, pioneers of the colonial trade, 
which had seen their best days in the seventeenth century. Similar! y, 
Rouen was in the process of transforming itself into an industrial center 
and its sea trade, though not its capital investments in international and 
colonial commerce, was losing its earlier predominance. The interest of 
these ports in privateering also dated from the seventeenth century, when 
98 Deliberations of CC Bayonne, meeting in extraordinary session , September 8 
and 18, 1755; CC Bayonne to Dulivier , November 25, 1755. ACC Bayonne, B6, pp. 437 
and 438; B25, p. 426. 
99 The freeing of the privateers dates from late May 1756. The first Bayonne 
privateer left in early July and there were eight at sea by the middle of August. The 
privateers of St. Jean-de-Luz were not far behind. CC Bayonne to CC Rouen, July 24, 
1756; same to Machault, August 19, 1756. Ibid. , B25, pp. 488 and 495. 
10° CC Bayonne to Machault , October 2, 1756, AN, Colonies, t '2B See also 
MAUPASSANT, " Abraham Gradis et l' approvisionnement des colonies," p. 180. 
IO I Minutes of a report to the Minister , February 1756, AN, Colonies, F<C: 5, fol. 
173. 
102 CC Bayonne to Partyet, January 18, 1752; same to Rouille, January 12, 1754 . 
ACC Bayonne, B24 , p. 391; B25, pp. 264-65. Numerous other references to this depletion 
of the city's merchant fleet through the sale of its components are found in the archives 
for this period. See, am on~ others, Deliberations of CC Ba yonne, June 30, 1751, ACC 
Bayonne B6, p. 211 ; and " Eta! du produit de la Recette fa ite au Bureau de la Coutume de 
Ba yonne ... [du] premier octobre 1752 [au] . . . 30 septembre 1753," ibid., B25, p. 272. 
103 Minutes of a report to the Minister , February 1756, AN, Colonies, F205, fol. 
173. 
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privateers had been in their heyday and their activities a normal part of a 
port' s business. It is striking to note that, despite certain efforts in this 
Jirection, none of the ports which were on the ascendency in the 
eighteenth century became a significant privateer harbour. 104 Even in war-
time, they had better things to do. 
No doubt, one of the reasons for which St. Malo, Bayonne and 
Dunkirk took up privateering with such eagerness during the Seven Years' 
War was that this type of navigation had proven a success for them in all 
the preceding wars. However, the eager continuation of this tradition in 
the eighteenth century, like the participation in codfishing, was now an in-
dication of a declining economic life. As the case of Bayonne indicates, it 
was the failure of peaceful activities and the resulting ready availability of 
vessels for privateering which provided the major impetus. 
* 
* * 
In the preceding discussion, it was made increasingly obvious that 
the ports of Bordeaux, Nantes, Marseilles and Le Havre had become or 
were becoming in the middle of the century the most important ports of 
France. At the same time, it emerged that certain other ports were in 
decline. Bayonne, St. Malo and Dunkirk were among those mentioned in 
this context. Rouen too had seen its best years as a commercial armament 
center in the late seventeenth and the early eighteenth centuries. 105 As for 
La Rochelle, through which still passed in the l 750's more goods than 
through Le Havre, its commerce remained stable while that of others 
grew. In short, the patterns which had prevailed in the seventeenth cen-
tury, when such ports as Dunkirk, Dieppe, Rouen, St. Malo and La 
Rochelle dominated the Atlantic trade, were in the process of changing, to 
be replaced b,y the pattern which still determines today the structure of 
French navigation. 
A number of causes have been given for this momentous change. One 
theory has it that the doom of seventeenth century ports was sealed by 
their lack of adequate hinterlands. Seventeenth century commerce, it is 
104 Marseilles may be the only exception. In 1756-1763 it captured some 150 
vessels, most of them in the Mediterranean and along the coast of West Africa. This ac-
tivity , however, was principally due to Georges Roux, who armed a veritable armada. The 
activities of one man, even when his example was followed by a few others, could not 
make for a really solid center of privateering activity. RAMBERT, Histoire du commerce de 
Marseille, la vie commerciale, p. 602; RAMBERT, Histoire du commerce de Marseille, Les 
colonies, p. 323. 
105 Statistics for Rouen's volume of trade are significant here. In the seventeenth 
century, Rouen's direct trade grew by some 80 percent (1614-1699); in the following fifty 
years U699-1750) , it dropped almost the same amount (72%). Pierre DARDEL, Le Tra.fic 
maritime de Rouen aux XVI/• et XVIII• siecles; essai de statistiques (Rouen, 1946), pp. 22-32. 
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argued, was relatively small and somewhat akin to the carrying trade of 
the Netherlands; the lack of a hinterland thus proved not to be a signifi-
cant factor then. But, when commerce grew in the eighteenth, the absence 
of adequate local markets and sources of supplies became a major hin-
drance to trade, and the leadership passed on to better situated ports, es-
pecially those at or near the mouths of the major French rivers. The 
theory is convincingly argued by the French economic historian Henri See 
for the Breton harbors, especially St. Malo and Morlaix. 106 The in-
adequacy of their back country no doubt contributed also to the decline of 
such ports as La Rochelle and Bayonne, as contemporaries of the events 
noted. 107 By the same token, the cereal and wine production of Bordeaux's 
hinterland clearly contributed to that port's West Indian commerce. 108 
Even in the case of Bordeaux, however, the hinterland thesis must not be 
over-emphasized, for the Garonne did not off er access to the major inland 
centers of production. It is equally conjectural for other ports. 109 Nantes' 
success was won in spite, rather than because of its location on the 
Loire. 110 The Rhone, too rapid for effective upstream navigation and 
separated from Marseilles by hills too steep for animal traction, was less 
important as a factor of that port's growth than the latter's stranglehold 
on Mediterranean commerce. 111 As for Rouen and Le Havre, which in the 
Seine possessed the best avenue to the heart of France, their traffic with 
the interior was carried by land rather than by river transportation. 112 
The significant growth of tonnage characterizing the eighteenth cen-
tury may also have contributed to the shift, 113 for many harbours dated 
106 See his "Le Commerce maritime de la Bretagne," especially pp. 125·27. 
107 CC La Rochelle to Maurepas. April 1, 1749, AN, Colonies, f2B: "Memoire a M. 
le Con[trol]leur general pour que Jes v[aisse)aux de Bayonne destinez p[our) Jes 
colonies soient dispensez de faire leur retour clans le port de leur armement et qu'il leur 
soit permis d'aller clans quelqu'un de france pour y faire leur dechargement & rearmement 
indistinctement." April 22, 1749, ACC Bayonne, B41, p. 364; "Courtes Notes a Extendre 
sur le Commerce de Bayonne," [ca. 1752], ibid., G5, no. 30; CC Bayonne to Rouille, 
Septembre 16, 1752, AN, Colonies, f'2ll2. 
108 CROUZET, in P ARISET, Bordeaux au XVIII•, p. 211. 
109 Ibid., pp. 206-07. 
110 BouLLE, " Slave Trade," p. 75. 
111 Louis BERGASSE, Histoire du commerce de Marseille, gen. ed. Gaston RAMBERT 
IV: 1, la Vie commerciale de 1599 d 1660 (Paris, 1954), pp. 128-31 and 135-36; MASSON 
Marseille et la colonisationfranr;aise, p. 161. 
112 Philippe-Augustin BARREY, "Le Havre maritime; la batellerie et Jes transports 
parterre du XVI" au XIX" siecle," in Julien HA YEM, ed., Memoires et documents pour servir d 
l'histoire du commerce et de l'industrie en France, VI (Paris, 1921), 67-126, and especially 
the schedule of prices and times, on pp. 118-19. See also LEON and CARRIERE, in BRAUDEL 
and LABROUSSE, Histoire economique et sociale de la France, II, 199-201, where the whole 
cause issue is discussed and the predominance of land travel in the eighteenth century 
noted. 
113 The crucial turn seems to have been the generalization of vessels over 100 
tonneaux (143 tons), which occurred sometimes in the early eighteenth century. DARDEL, 
le Trajic maritime de Rouen, pp. 122-24; Paul Jacques CHARLIAT, Trois siecles d'economie 
maritimefranr;aise (Paris, 1931), pp. 56-57. 
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from a time when technology had dictated that they be placed deep inland, 
on rivers or estuaries, where land and water communications first crossed. 
The tonnage which they could accommodate was bound to be limited. This 
was the case for Rouen, located some 100 miles from the sea, for various 
ports on the English Channel and in Brittany, and for Bayonne, situated 
some distance up the Adour, the mouth of which was obstructed by a par-
ticularly troublesome sandbar and the wreck of a corsair dating from the 
War of the Austrian Succession. La Rochelle was also in difficulty, despite 
its direct access to the sea, for it was situated on an area of the French 
coast where the land was gaining on the sea and the silting was made worse 
by the remnants of the dike built by Richelieu during the seventeenth-
century siege of the city. 114 It should however be noted that Bordeaux and 
Nantes were not much better placed. This was especially true for Nantes 
which, like Rouen, needed to transfer cargo from vessels over 100 
tonneaux to tenders some distance downstream. t1 5 Indeed, only Marseilles 
was blessed with a deep, easily accessible harbour, a fact attested to by the 
tonnage of its vessels, which awed its rivals. 116 
114 An eighteenth century description of nearly every Atlantic and English 
Channel harbour is found in CHAZELLES, "Memoire sur les Costes Occidentales de France, 
Pour servir a la Navigation," AN, M1031. On Rouen, see also Philippe-Augustin BARREY, 
" Le Havre et la navigation aux Antilles sous l'ancien regime; la question coloniale en 
1789-1791," in Julien HA YEM, ed., Memoires et documents pour servir ti l 'histoire du commerce 
et de l'industrie en France, V (Paris, 1917), p. 80; Michel DESMONTS, le Port de Rauen et son 
commerce avec l 'Amerique (Rouen, 1912), p. 6; DARDEL, Navires et marchandises, pp. 241-42 
and 297-98. The situation of Breton ports is discussed in SEE, "Le Commerce maritime de 
la Hretagne," pp. 173-200. Un Hayonne, see also CC Bayonne to Rouille, Gctober 2, 1751, 
ACC Bayonne, B24, p. 373; DuBEZIN, "Observations Faites par le Soubsigne sur la Lettre 
Ecritte par Monsieur Derouville [Herouville de Claye] ... a Messieurs ... de notre Cham-
bre," [September 1755], ibid., E5, no. 37. The general condition of the coast between 
Loire and Gironde is discussed in Pierre VIDAL DE LA BLACHE, Tableau de la geographie de 
la France l Ernest LAVISSE, ed., Histoire de France depuis Les origines jusqu 'ti la Revolution, l: 
l] (Paris, 1903), pp. 371-72. On the position of La Rochelle, see GARNAULT, le Commerce 
rochelais au XVll/•, II, 115-17 and 134. 
115 BouLLE, "Slave Trade," p. 75; CROUZET, in PARISET, Bordeaux au XVII/•, 
p. 207. 
' 
116 See the comments of Bordeaux in CC Bordeaux to Carton, June 17, 1749, AD 
Gironde, C4263, fol. 103v. A look at the "TABLEAU de depart des Navires marchands de 
divers ports, Pour les Colonies de l'Amerique," AN, Colonies, FZB2, shows clearly 
Marseilles' advantage between 1749 and 1755: 
AVERAGE FREIGHT VESSELS 
PORT PER SHIP INVOLVED 
Marseilles 342 tonneaux 146 
Honfleur 249 14 
Le Havre 222 238 
Bordeaux 219 1151 
Nantes 217 737 
La Rochelle 215 289 
Bayonne 164 71 
General Average 220 2646 
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The nearby availability of industries allied to the port's commerce 
may also have had an impact. Bordeaux's thriving sugar refineries and to a 
lesser extent those of the Loire valley for Nantes contributed no doubt to 
those ports' colonial economy. Similarly, Le Havre would not have 
experienced the growth it did in the second half of the eighteenth century 
without Rouen 's textile manufactures and capital. Bayonne put the matter 
concisely: Its slave trading ventures had failed and its West Indian traffic 
was languishing, it said, because the port, on the one hand, " ... is obliged 
to draw from other regions almost everything which forms its [outgoing] 
cargoes ... " and, on the other, because "we do not have refineries near-
by." Under such conditions, Bayonne" ... can hardly sustain the competi-
tion of the other ports of the Realm." 117 On the other hand, the reverse 
argument, that a port's traffic supported the nearby industries, is equally 
convincing. The latter was clearly the case for Nantes' pacotille manufac-
tures. 118 
Not all explanations have to do with the strategic situation of the 
ports. The loss of capital, as merchants invested in land and offices in an 
effort to climb the social ladder, has often been argued and it was probably 
more heavily felt in the older ports, where the bourgeoisie had been longer 
established, than in the recent ones. 119 But the discrepancy between old 
and new ports in this respect should not be exaggerated. Every commercial 
centre in France had its share of ennobled, land- or office-holding 
merchants; those of the most successful ports merely continued to invest 
and, indeed, at times to participate in the city's commercial activities. 120 
The social mores of the time, with their ideal of living nobly, thus no 
doubt contributed to the older ports' decline, by permanently removing 
capital and skilled personnel from them, but it was not an initial cause. 
Declining traffic and reduced profits simply rendered non-commercial ac-
tivities or even commercial investments elsewhere increasingly attrac-
tive. 121 Similarly, legal and especially fiscal advantages, except perhaps ac-
cidentally, 122 were not a key factor, although the revoking of St. Malo's 
The largest French merchant vessel of the period seems to have been Le Splendide of 
Marseilles. It measured 580 tonneaux, or some 830 tons. Gaston RAMBERT, "De l'aisance a 
la fortune, de la fortune a la pauvrete: GeorRe Roux de Corse fut l'un des Fram,;ais !es plus 
riches et les plus puissants du XVIII• siecle,' Transmondia, No. 78 (March 1961), p. 23. 
117 CC Bayonne to Rouille, February 1754, AN, Colonies, F2B2; same to Choiseul, 
November 30, 1762, ACC Bayonne, B26, p. 258. 
118 BouLLE, "Slave Trade," passim. 
119 StE. " Le Commerce maritime de la Bretagne," pp. 126 and 169. 
12° For examples of this, see BouLLE, "Slave Trade," pp. 85·89; RAMBERT, "George 
Roux, " passim. 
121 See the comments of a St. Malo notable, Delalande-Magnon, according to 
whom St. Malo merchants " ... achettent des terres pour conserver quelque chose du 
debris de leur fortune." Letter to Macha ult, May 9, 1755, AN, Colonies, f'ZB2. 
122 BouLLE, "Slave Trade," pp. 76-77. 
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freeport status in 1667, Ly drastically cutting into its carrying trade, 
probably contributed to its decline, and Marseilles ' monopoly of the Le-
vant trade immensely helped the latter. 123 
It remains to note that the decline and rise of certain ports in the 
eighteenth century is associated with a shift in the importance of par-
ticular colonial trades. In sum, the most successful colonial investments 
of the seventeenth century were in fish, furs and privateers; those of the 
eighteenth, in sugar and slaves. It happens that the declining ports were 
associated with the former , while the successful centers placed their 
emphasis on the latter. To say this, however, is merely to note that the 
ports which declined did not shift traffic in time and thus remained tied to 
declining trades. Colonial commerce is no more a primary cause of the 
shift in trade which the ports experienced in the eighteenth century than 
other explanations, although it is a remarkably accurate barometer of that 
shift. We are thus left with the conclusion of a recent analysis of these 
factors : " No doubt , the number of men, their capital as well as their dar-
ing were the fruit of a long past, requiring the support of the explanations 
given above. But this is the rich complexity of history: Each buttress 
insufficient ; their union is the necessary combination." 124 
* 
* * 
Not only did the years 17 49-1755 witness the greatest French com-
mercial expansion of the century, but it now seems apparent that this _period 
was also the turning point for a great many ports. These were the years 
during which pressures obliged the declining ports to abandon some of 
their trade relations and permanently limit their ambitions. Such ports as 
St. Malo, La Rochelle and Bayonne noted with increasing alarm the 
exodus of their labourers and the decline in number of their merchants. 125 
These same few years also saw the rising ports gain the final edge. 126 It is 
clear then that, despite the destructiveness of the Seven Years' War, the 
very tenuous balance which had existed between the various French ports 
was being unhinged before its outbreak. Yet, it is undeniable that this war 
123 See the comments of CROUZET, in PARISET, Bordeaux au XVIII', pp. 205-06. 
124 LEON and CARRIERE, in BRAUDEL and LABROUSSE, Histoire economique et sociale 
de la France , II , 201. 
125 
· Delalande-Magnon to Machault , May 9, 1755, AN, Colonies, F 2B 2; CC La 
Rochelle to Rouille, March 3, 1752, ibid.; CC Ha t onne to Partyet, January 18, 1752, ACC 
Bayonne, B24, p. 391 ; " Memoire sur Jes faillites,' 1754, ibid., G70, no. 16; CC Bayonne to 
Rouille , February 1754, AN, Colonies, f2B2 . 
126 The declining ports noted this phenomenon, which made their recovery even 
more problematic. It was not only that they were experiencing a depression ; they were 
experiencing it while their rivals were enjoying an economic boom. CC Bayonne to 
Duli vier, April 18, 1752, ACC Ba yonne, B24 , p. 433; CC La Rochelle to Maurepas, April 1, 
1749, AN, Colonies, f 2B2. 
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accentuated the existing trend. It will be remembered that it began with an 
extremely costly undeclared war on the French merchant marine and con-
tinued with great thoroughness on the part of the British navy. Few were 
the ports which could afford the losses they experienced in that war. In 
fact, except for Marseilles and Bordeaux, most French ports had , by 1759, 
interrupted colonial commerce, the most vulnerable sector of their ac-
tivities. 127 Some of them replaced it with privateering, but even this activi-
ty was greatly reduced after the first few years of the war. 128 
The Seven Years' War , whose economic impact was particularly 
severe on France's colonial trade, completed the change begun in this 
branch by the developments of the previous twenty years. Colonial com-
merce, requiring a large concentration of capital, was already becoming 
before the war the domain of a relatively small number of individuals in 
each "privileged" port. 129 By eating up the reserves of the smaller en-
trepreneurs in colonial commerce and, thereby, impeding their power of 
recuperation, the war helped to eliminate a great number of them from the 
running. 130 
The reshuffling which took place among individuals within each port 
also happened among the French harbours themselves. In particular, when 
peace came again, some of the " privileged" ports - those which had 
already been in some difficulty before the war -found themselves without 
the capital needed to take up again such expensive ventures as the colonial 
trade. In consequence, while these ports limited themselves to European 
127 Save for the crown charters, Bordeaux almost stopped trafficking. CROUZET, in 
PARISET, Bordeaux au XVII/•, pp. 299-300. As for Marseilles, its losses were staggering. In 
1757 a lon e, the insurance claims from that port reached 241, the larges t number for any 
yea r during the eighteenth century. " Registres des declarations des f.ertes et prises," 
1688-1793, ACC Marseilles , E97- 104. And not all vessels were insure . The traffi c con-
tinued aft er this, but only at a very reduced rate. RAMBERT, Histoire du commerce de 
Marseille, les colonies, p. 327. 
128 Bayonne totall y gave up in 1758. CC Bayonne to Dulivier, April 8, 1758, ACC 
Bayonne, B26, p. 95. Only Dunkirk and St. Malo continued to send their corsairs out in 
significant numbers through the years of the war. In the case of the latter , however, the 
traffic was int errupted for some tim e as a result of the British attack of 1758. BERTRAND. 
" Le Port de Dunkerque," p. 349; SEE, " Le Commerce maritime de la Bre tagne," p. 90. On 
the effec ts of the l:lritish raid of June 1758, see Andre UuCASSE, Ltudes sur la guerre de Sept 
ans. Le ministere de Belle-Isle: Kreferd et Liitterberg, 1758 (Paris, 1914), pp. 403-04. 
129 The social and economic differences between international and especially 
co lonia l merchants and those involved in the more local, traditional trades were reflec ted 
in th e names given each in the eighteenth century. Although the fronti ers between the 
two groups were never en tirely watertight, the first were called armateurs or negociants, the 
second marchands. In each port , the first form ed an o ligarchy. dominating liw 1•co110111v 
and represented by the chamber of commerce or its local counterpart. For Nantes, see 
BouLLE, " Slave Trade," pp. 87-88 and especially the description by Francis Lefeuvre, 
quoted therein: for Bordeaux, see J.-P. Poussou, in PARISET, Bordeaux au XVIII•, pp. 346-
57, Pspecially pp. 351-53. See also LEoN, in BRAUDEL and LABROUSSE, Histoire economique et 
socinle de In France, II, 610-17. 
130 See above, footnote 16. 
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commerce, the more ambitious traffics were left in the hands of a small 
number of places whose merchants had found sufficient reserves in 1762-
1763 to make up quickly the losses which the war had caused. 
At the top of the n'ew hierarchy were the ports of Marseilles, 
Bordeaux and Le Havre, the latter entering into its most rapid period of 
growth after 1763. These three ports had never entirely lost their activity 
during the war and answered the news of peace with large colonial 
expeditions meant to capitalize on the seller's market which wartime shor-
tages had created in America. Within a few years-a few months even in 
some branches of colonial trade - the commerce of these ports was back 
to its prewar level. Nantes also recovered quickly, its total tonnage 
reaching prewar levels as early as 1764 and averaging in the postwar 
period (1763-1776) 36 percent more than in the previous period of peace 
(1749-1754). 131 Yet the West Indian and African branches of its trade, 
which in prewar years had been responsible for growth, were the last to 
recover. The average figures reached by direct West Indian trade were not 
achieved again until the end of the decade, save for the exceptional year 
1764, the result of a short-run all-out effort immediately after peace was 
announced. Even worse, the prewar slave trade tonnages were not match-
ed until 1783, and the more crucial statistics for slaves imported into the 
West Indies never again. Similar declines were experienced in certain 
types of West Indian imports. The deficits in these trade were made up by 
increased figures for European commerce. Indeed, although the port's 
volume of trade continued to grow until the French Revolution, its rate of 
increase declined constantly, both in relationship to the contemporary 
achievements of the three pace-setters and in relationship to Nantes' own 
prewar statistics. Despite the volume of its trade, which still placed Nantes 
among the leaders, the port was no longer one of the innovators, especially 
in its colonial traffics. 132 
The case of La Rochelle is even more striking; in a sense, it is also 
more tragic. It will be remembered that, even before the war, La 
Rochelle's position among the great French harbors was shaky, and the 
loss in the war of Canada, a colony which was more important for La 
Rochelle than for any other port, severely affected it. Under the cir-
cumstances, it would not have surprised anyone to see La Rochelle aban-
131 On Marseilles, see the figures found in RAMBERT, Histoire du commerce de 
Marseille, les colonies, p. 654; on Bordeaux, see those in MALVEZIN, Histoire du commerce de 
Bordeaux, XVIII•, pp. 306-07 and 310-17; on Le Havre, see those in DARDEL, Navires et 
marchandises , pp. 222-23, 415 and 611. 
132 Statistics from MEYER, L 'Armement nant_ais, pp. 83-85; )EULIN, L 'Evolution du 
port de Nantes, pp. 224-27 and 256; and MARTIN, L 'Ere des negriers, plate VII. Meyer, who 
notes these changes (l 'Armement nantais, pp. 82 and 88), terms them "incidences 
min eures" (ibid., p. 250). For my comments on Meyer's views, see BouLLE, "Slave 
Trade," pp. 105-06. 
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don its colonial ambitions. The contrary occurred. Perhaps because they 
were driven by desperation, its merchants showed an unmatched spirit of 
daring and adventure in the l 760's. Needing to increase the other colonial 
branches of their commerce to make up their lost Canadian ties, they were 
among the first in France to think of copying Nantes' triangular trade. 133 
More important, they ventured into the less developed regions of the 
French American empire. They were realistic enough to know that they 
had little chance in a competition with their colleagues of Bordeaux, 
Nantes and Marseilles for a larger share of commerce on the main West 
Indian islands; while therefore they continued what commerce they had 
with Martinique and St. Domingue, it is on their ties with Louisiana that 
they placed the heaviest emphasis. From this colony, they hoped to 
receive some of the goods which Canada had previously furnished to 
them. 134 Perhaps their ambitions were above their means; no doubt, the 
geographical factors which had placed their port at a disadvantage before 
the war continued to play against them; it was, however, most unfortunate 
that, through no fault of their own, they were deprived of the area where 
they had made their greatest efforts. For, unbeknownst to them, the 
French government had given away Louisiana to the Spanish. The laws 
regulating foreign commerce were applied after 1772 to the products of 
the ex-colony and La Rochelle's trade with the Mississippi valley fell to 
nothing. 135 Despite some new efforts to reorient their activities once again, 
this time toward India, 136 La Rochelle did not really recover from the 
blow. Well before the end of the century, it was reduced to the level of a 
subsidiary port. 137 
Nantes and La Rochelle had been among the prewar leaders. If they 
were forced by the war to reduce their ambitions, so were the lesser ports. 
Except for some international trade, the latter settled into supporting 
roles, those of supplying their more fortunate colleagues with local 
products and of retailing along the coast the colonial and international 
goods brought to France by the great harbors. Such a role had been that of 
Marseilles' client harbors in Languedoc and Provence even before the 
war. 138 The ports of Brittany began to take on that function for their major 
133 
" Memoire" of CC La Rochelle to Rouille d'Orfeuil, November 1762, AN, 
Colonies, f.2B2. 
134 GARNAULT, Le Commerce rochel.ais au XVII/", V, 364-65. By 1768, La Rochelle 
had become a major supplier of Louisiana and one of its most important exporters. Pierre 
H. BouLLE, "French Reactions to the Louisiana Revolution of 1768," in John F. McDER· 
MOTT, ed., The French in the Mississippi Valley (Urbana, Ill., 1965), p. 154. 
135 GARNAULT, Le Commerce ·r~chelais au XVII/•, V, 365-66. 
136 The Company's monopoly had just been abolished. Ibid., pp. 299-305, 326 and 
334-36. 
137 SEE, L 'Evolution commerciale, p. 243. 
138 RAMBERT, Histoire du commerce de Marseille, la vie commerciale, pp. 333-39 and 
392-408; Gaston RAMBERT, "Toulon et !'exportation des vins provern;aux par Marseille au 
XVIII• siecle," Provence historique, XII (1962), 20-26. 
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Atlantic colleagues after the Seven Years' War. 139 A somewhat similar 
transformation took place in the Seine River basin, where Rouen 
merchants relinquished most of their direct sea trade to take on a support-
ing role to their partners in Le Havre. They supplied the latter with 
capital and served as their middlemen with inland suppliers and clients, 
whether from Rouen or from further up the Seine. Unlike St. Malo or 
Bayonne, however, Rouen thus entered into a new career in which it 
would reap new benefits. 140 
* 
* * 
Lack of sufficient reserves, the bounds of tradition, the limiting fac-
tors of geography or even ill fortune, which have served as explanations 
for the reshuffle following the Seven Years' War, are not entirely respon-
sible for the difference from port to port in the speed and completeness of 
their recovery from the effects of the war, the first major indication of the 
above-mentioned reshuffle. No doubt, these factors explain the lowering 
sights with which such ports as St. Malo met the postwar world; they 
explain also the degradation of Bayonne's commercial activities, already 
begun well before the war; they may even be the cause of La Rochelle's 
disappointed postwar expectations. They do not fully explain the declining 
growth of such a port as Nantes, which remained one of the great harbors 
of the period, endowed with very advanced commercial methods, and 
which emerged from the war with sufficient reserves to carry through to 
its conclusion an already-begun program of municipal construction equal-
led in France only by the better-known campaign in Bordeaux. 
Paradoxically, it may be the modernity of Nantes' commercial 
methods which was at the root of the port's difficulties. What made the 
methods of Nantes modern was the port's specialization, not only in the 
slave trade, but in a slave trade based on advanced industrial processes 
foreshadowing the mass-production techniques of a later century. Nantes 
may have been over-specialized for the period. 
It is striking to note that the ports which recovered most quickly 
from the Seven Years' War were those with the most varied trade 
relations. Though playing a crucial role in Marseilles' commerce, the 
colonial traffic of that port was greatly overshadowed by its Mediterranean 
139 SEE, "Le Commerce maritime de la Bretagne," pp. 175-200; Rene DURAND, "Le 
Commerce de la Bretagne au XVIII• siecle," Annales de Bretagne, XXXII (1917), 447-69. 
140 Pierre DARDEL, Commerce, industrie et navigation a Rouen et au Havre au XVII/< 
siecle (Rouen, 1966) , pp. 231 and 260; DARDEL, Navires et marchandises , pp. 246-47. The 
interdependence of Rouen and Le Havre (as well as Honfleur) was not new; it existed as 
early as 1717, when a governmental decree recognized the three ports as a single unit for 
the purpose of collecting duties. Arret of August 28, 1717, cited in DARDEL, Commerce, in-
dustrie et navigation, pp. 351-53. What was new was the reversal of roles between Rouen 
and Le Havre, at least in maritime affairs. 
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connections, particularly those with the Levant, with Spain and with 
Italy. Bordeaux's colonial commerce was more important, ranging from 34 
to 50 percent of its total traffic in the eighteenth century, 141 but it was so 
widespread that a reverse in one branch was likely to be accompanied by a 
success in another. As for Le Havre and its partners on the Seine, their in-
teres t were probably the farthest ranging in France. On the other hand, 
Nantes and La Rochelle were committed to one or two major lines. 
Commercial reverses were difficult for them to repair. They and also 
Bayonne, which relied so heavily on Spanish commerce, suffered from an 
unbalance similar to that of Lyons, the economic welfare of which, mainly 
connected with textile manufacturing, was at the mercy of any distur-
bance, whether national or international, whether climatic or political. 142 
Over-specialization was not the sole cause of a city's decline; the case of 
Lyons is proof of this, for the city survived the Seven Years' War and 
numerous other crises to retain its position as the major French industrial 
city for another century or so. When , however, specialization was com-
bined with other factors, it tended to trigger a prolonged period of 
decadence, such as befell the port of La Rochelle , or at least hinder 
growth, as in Nantes. 
Thus, the Seven Years' War seems to have been more easily borne by 
the ports where commerce was not yet fully specialized. However, it 
created the conditions for a new drive toward rationalization, the outcome 
of which was a commercial distribution system in which some ports 
carried the brunt of the international trade while others served as their 
retailers. In a sense, therefore, the Seven Years' War had a beneficial 
effect, as all crises tend to have. The Peace of Paris, by retaining for 
France the crucial regions of colonial trade - the West Indies and a base 
in Africa - at the expense of nearly all else and especially Canada, served 
to rationalize colonial trade. Ports which had once been great fell by the 
wayside as a result of this rationalization. Nantes and La Rochelle too, 
despite the vision and imagination of their merchants, were the victims of 
this process of adaptation. Still entrapped in the earlier system, by which 
each port worked independently of the others, they declined before the 
interdependence of all French ports had been created and had, in the 
process, developed sufficient new markets to insure the success of the 
methods Nantes had initiated and La Rochelle followed. 
141 CROUZET, in PARISET, Bordeaux au XVIII•, p. 198n. 
142 PARISET, La Chambre de commerce de Lyon, I, 26 and 68-71. 
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APPENDIX 
Table III is constructed from a variety of sources, generally of local origins. These sources are not 
equally reliable, nor do they all cover exactly the same years. As a result, they are not entirely consis-
tent with each other. Furthermore, monetary values are not available for all areas of French colonial 
trade. In some cases, it was nevertheless possible to remedy the deficiency by reaching an estimate 
through a more or less complicated process of interpolation. However, the more complicated the 
process , the larger the margin of error and, consequently , the less reliable the answer. Such results are 
placed in parentheses to indicate that they are particularly unreliable approximations. 
The process through which such evaluations have been reached, as well as the specific source for 
and years covered by each of the various statistics of the table. is dt'scril,..d IH'low. Wht'll missillg ill 
the Appendix, first references to works cited therein are foulld ill f"ootlloh's 1-21 or tht' tt'\l. 
FRANCE: The figure for the slave trade refers to the worth of this commerce during the period 
1750-1756. It was tabulated from the numbers given in "Memoire [sur la] Traitte des Negres." 1762 
(AN , Colonies , Ml024), and from the average. value of 1,000 livres per slave sold in the West Indies 
during the period (Theophile MALVEZIN, Histoire du commerce de Bordeaux, depuis les origines jusqu 'd 
nos jours, III . XVIII' siecle [Bordeaux, 1892], p." 208). It may be noted here that the price cited by 
Malvezin may be too moderate for the period 1750-1756. Another scholar quotes the price of 1,300 
Livres as an average for the year 1753, and for adul: males sold in St. Domingue between 1750 and 1755 
prices ranging from 1,160 to 1,400 livres. Lucien Pierre PEYTRAUD, L 'Esclavage aux Antilles franr;aises 
avant 1789 (Paris, 1897), p. 126. The value of the cod fishing (1750-1755) was tabulatt'd through a 
lellgthy and complicated process of interpolation from the figures giwll for <'ach port of France in 
Charles DE LA MoRANDIERE, Histoire de La peche franraise de la morue dans I "A11u'riq111· septe11trio1111Le (3 
vols.; Paris, 1962-1966) , II , 525-612. The number of fishing vesst•ls St'llt hy <'ach port to North 
America in the period was recorded (this number at times represents a y<'arly avPragt' based on a 
llumber of years; more frequently, it is the number given for a single ypar; sometinws, it is a mere es-
timation) . Whenever a number of vessels and a value for their cargo was gin·n. all average per ship 
was recorded and applied to the vessel number for the years 1749-1756. Ill most cases. however, 
figures available for the value of the catch were found only for the post-1763 period. When no value 
could be found , the average worth for all the other ports was utilized. The figtm' arrivt'd at does not 
differ significantly from that reached through the interpolation or the statistics foulld in ARNOULD, 
Balance du commerce, III , table 2E. This table provides figures only for the years 1716 and 1787. 
Assuming that the cod fishing industry grew evenly throughout the century. om· rt'adws an annual 
figure of 8.6 million livres for the years 1750-1756. Nor does the numJ,..r or """"ls taliulated in the 
manner described above (366) vary very much from La Morandif>re' s final 1·stimati· of approximately 
390 vessels for the year 1754, 'Tune des meilleures pour le commerct' morutiPr fran~ais" (Histoire de 
la pechefrant;aise, II, 635). All other figures come from ARNOULD, Balance du co111111erce. Ill, tables l0-
l3. The years to which they refer are 1749-1755. A look at these years on Uon·s waph. in liRAUDEL 
and LABROUSSE, Histoire economique et sociale de La France, II , 502. gives somewhat smallN averages for 
the total colonial trade (imports: ca. 87 million livres ; exports: ca. 43 million /i1•res). However, the 
graph probably does not include the cod fisheries. 
BORDEAUX: The slave statistics are deducted_ from CROUZET, in PARISET, Bordeaux au XVII/', 
p. 238, according to which 37 slaving vessels left Bordeaux between 1749 and 1755. The value of this 
trade was reached by prorating the number of slaves per ship from available statistics for Nantes and 
taking the average cash value of each slave from above. The fishing statistics rt'fer to the year l767, 
during which 41 vessels unloaded their cargo in Bordeaux (LA MoRANDIERE, Histoire de la peche 
franr;aise, II, 599). Approximately the same number of vessels is given by tht• sanlt' sourct' for the vea r 
l7~2 (ibid. , II , 598) and it was assumed that the trade did not vary significantly IH'twt•i•n these two 
dates. All other statistics refer to the period 1750-1755. They stem from tables 3, 5 and 6 in MALVEZIN, 
Histoire du commerce de Bordeaux, XVIII', pp. 306-07 and 310-17. West Indian imports are given in 
Robert BOUTRUCHE, Bordeaux et le commerce des Antilles au XVIII' siecle (Orleans, [1935]), p. 14n, as 
equal to two-thirds of the total imports of Bordeaux. The figures for West Indian exports are prorated 
from tonnage figures in my Table II. 
NANTES : Slave trade statistics (1750-1755) are taken from Gaston MARTIN, Nantes au XVIII' 
siecle, II. L 'Ere des negriers, 1714-1774 (Paris, 1931), plate VII. The value is the same as for FRANCE. 
Fishing statistics are prorated from the number of vessels in 1738 and 1763, assuming an even decline 
86 HISTOIRE SOCIALE - SOCIAL HISTORY 
of the traffic during the intermediate years. The value is that given for the year 1763 (LA MORANDIERE, 
Histoire de la pechefranfaise, II, 581). Figures for West Indian imports and all export statistics (1752) 
are from Paul JEULIN, L 'Evolution du port de Nantes; organisation et tra.fic depuis Les origines (Paris, 
1929) , tables I and I bis, pp. 224-27 . 
. MARSEILLES: The figure of 3.1 million livres for fishing imports isfor codfish imported in the 
yea r 1754 (RAMBERT, Histoire du commerce de Marseille, Les colonies, p. 502) , identified as " la plus 
favorable de l'Ancien Regime" by this author as well . The figure s tands well within the ones found in 
LA MORANDIERE, Histoire de la pechefranfaise, II, 608, none of which apply to the years 1750-1755. 
The figure for American and West African imports (1750-1755) is taken from RAMBERT, Histoire du 
commerce de Marseille, Les colonies, p. 654. It includes West Indian impo.rt s, which made up the hulk of 
the trade, and all other American imports. It does not include African commerce, since only one vessel 
was recorded in the period to have gone from Marseilles to West Africa (ibid .. p. 160). Exports to the 
West Indies (1750-1755) come from ibid., p. 654. 
LE HAVRE AND RODEN: Fishing statistics (ca. 1750) are an average of conflicting figures given 
tor the number of fishing vessels entering Le Havre in BoRELY, Histoire de la ville du H<ivre, III, 328, 
and DARDEL, Navires et marchandises, table XXXIX, pp. 614-15. The value of the cargo is prorated from 
figures for Marseilles. West Indian imports (1753) are taken from ibid .. tahlP I, pp. 548-49. 
LA ROCHELLE : The value of the slave trade is tabulated in the same manner as that of 
BORDEAUX and based .on the figure of 45 vessels sent to West Africa between 1749 and 1755 
(CROUZET, in PARISET, Bordeaux au XV/If•, p. 238). Fish ing stati stics are based on the estimated 
number of vessels entering La Rochelle between 1749 and 1755 and the value of ca rgoes unloaded in 
1764 and 1765 (LA MoRANDIERE, Histoire de la peche franraise , II , 595-96). All other statistics apply to 
the yea rs 1750-1754 and are taken from GARNAULT, Le Commerce rochelais au XVflf•, IV, 331. 
BAYONNE: Fishing statistics apply to both Bayonne and its neighbor, St. Jean-de-Luz. They are 
tabulated from the number of vessels sen t by these two ports in 1750 and the value of the catch for 
1765 (LA MORANDIERE, Histoire de la pechefranfaise, II , 603-04) . West Indian imports and all export 
figures are taken from the yearly Recapitulations of imports and exports for the years 1753-1756, in 
ACC Bayonne, C31. 
COMPAGNIE DES IND ES: Same source as for FRANCE. The figures apply to the years 1749-
1755. 
